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PROMISES OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
TO NEWS SOURCES AFTER 
COHEN v. COWLES MEDIA 
COMPANY: A SURVEY OF 
NEWSPAPER EDITORS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
DANIEL A. LEVIN* 
ELLEN BLUMBERG RUBERT** 
If a reporter promises confidentiality to a news source in ex-
change for information, and the reporter's editorial superiors 
break that promise by publishing the information and disclosing 
the source's name, may the source recover damages for breach of 
promise under state law without violating the First Amend-
ment? In Cohen u. Cowles Media Company, the Minnesota state 
courts and the United States Supreme Court addressed that 
question. 1 The courts ultimately decided that such a source may 
* Instructor in Business and Employment Law, University of Colorado, College of 
Business. A.B., 1976, Washington University, St. Louis; M.B.A., 1990, University of Colo-
rado, Graduate School of Business Administration; J.D., 1982, University of the Pacific, 
McGeorge School of Law. 
** Professor of Business Law, College of Lake County. B.A., 1969, U.C.L.A.; M.B.A., 
1980, Loyola University of Chicago Graduate School of Business; J.D., 1976, lIT Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law. 
1. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. App. 1989); 457 N.W.2d 199 
(Minn. 1990); III S. Ct. 2513 (1991); 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992); 481 N.W.2d 840 
(Minn. 1992). 
The first four Cohen decisions are discussed at length in this article. The fifth Cohen 
decision, reported at 481 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1992), is a one-paragraph order responding 
to defendant newspapers' petition for rehearing asking the Minnesota Supreme Court to 
consider whether Cohen was entitled to pre- and post-judgment interest. In its order, the 
Supreme Court remanded the interest issue to the trial court for its consideration, and 
denied Cohen's motion for Rule 11 sanctions and attorney fees in responding to the peti-
tion for rehearing. 
Commentary on the Cohen case includes Julia A. Loquai, Comment, Keeping Tabs 
on the Press: Individual Rights v. Freedom of the Press Under the First Amendment, 
423 
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indeed recover damages against the newspaper under state law 
without a First Amendment violation. 
We undertook a survey of newspaper editors to determine 
their views regarding promises of confidentiality, to determine 
the effect of the Cohen case on the newspaper industry, and to 
discover related information. This article will discuss the Cohen 
case and report the survey results. 
Section II of the article sets forth the facts that led to the 
lawsuit brought by source Dan Cohen against two Minneapolis 
newspapers for breach of promise of confidentiality. Section III 
sets forth the history of the lawsuit itself, as it proceeded 
through the Minnesota state courts to the United States Su-
preme Court, reaching a final resolution on remand to the Min-
nesota Supreme Court. The Minnesota Court of Appeals deci-
sion, the Minnesota Supreme Court's first decision, and the 
16 HAMLINE L. REV. 447 (1993); Robert E. Drechsel, Media Ethics and Media Law: The 
Transformation of Moral Obligation Into Legal Principle, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL'y 5 (1992); Patrick M. Garry, The Trouble with Confidential Sources: A Criti-
cism of the Supreme Court's Interest-Group View of the First Amendment in Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co., 14 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 403 (1992); Kyu Ho Youm and Harry 
W. Stonecipher, The Legal Bounds of Confidentiality Promises: Promissory Estoppel 
and the First Amendment, 45 FED. COMM. L. J. 63 (1992); Jeffry A. Brueggeman, Note, 
Where Is the First Amendment When You Really Need It? Lowering the Constitutional 
Barrier to Suits Against the Press, 9 J. L. & POL. 147 (1992); Timothy J. Fallon, Note, 
Stop the Presses: Reporter-Source Confidentiality Agreements and the Case for En-
forcement, 33 B. C. L. REV. 599 (1992); Susan S. Greenebaum, Comment, Confidentiality 
Agreements Between the Press and its Sources: Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 
2513,41 WASH. u.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 243 (1992); Elisabeth L'Heureux, Note, Freedom 
of the Press - Confidentiality - Reporters are Liable Under Promissory Estoppel Doc-
trine for Breach of Source Confidentiality Agreement, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 345 
(1992); Patrick M. McCarthy, Note, 69 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 339 (1992); Gregory F. 
Monday, Note, Cohen v. Cowles Media is Not a Promising Decision, 1992 WISCONSIN L. 
REV. 1243; Harold B. Oakley, Note, Promises of Confidentiality: Do Reporters Really 
Have to Keep Their Word? 57 Mo. L. REV. 955 (1992); William Penner, Note, Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co.: Upsetting the First Amendment Scales, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 753 (1992); 
Jeffrey A. Richards, Note, Confidentially Speaking: Protecting the Press from Liability 
for Broken Confidentiality Promises - Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 67 
WASH. L. REV. 501 (1992); C. Adrian Vermeule, Note, Confidential Media Sources and 
the First Amendment: Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'y 266 (1992); Susan Allison Weifert, Note, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.: Bad News 
for Newsgatherers; Worse News for the Public, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099 (1992); Jens 
B. Koepke, Comment, Reporter Privilege: Shield or Sword? Applying a Modified Breach 
of Contract Standard When a Newspaper "Burns" a Confidential Source, 42 FED. 
COMM. L. J. 277 (1990); Michael Dicke, Note, Promises and the Press: First Amendment 
Limitations on News Source Recovery for Breach of a Confidentiality Agreement, 73 
MINN. L. REV. 1553 (1989). 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss2/4
1994] COHEN v. COWLES MEDIA COMPANY 425 
United States Supreme Court's decision in the case were all split 
decisions. Section III includes a summary of the arguments 
made by both the court majorities and the dissenters. Section IV 
reports and discusses the survey results. Section V provides a 
summary and conclusion. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2 
In the 1982 Minnesota state elections, Wheelock Whitney 
was the Independent Republican ("IR") party candidate for gov-
ernor and former governor Rudy Perpich was the Democratic-
Farmer-Labor ("DFL") party candidate.3 One week before the 
elections, IR supporter and former Hennepin county attorney· 
Gary Flakne discovered two public court records concerning 
Marlene Johnson, the DFL candidate for lieutenant governor. 
The first record showed that Johnson had been arrested in 1969 
for unlawful assembly, and that the charge was later dismissed. 
The second record showed that Johnson had been arrested and 
convicted of petty theft in 1970, and that the conviction was va-
cated in 1971. 
On Wednesday, October 27, 1982, shortly after the discov-
ery of the Johnson records, several IR supporters met to discuss 
the release of these documents to the media. I! Among the people 
2. The facts of the Cohen case stated here are taken from the reported Cohen deci-
sions. See supra note 1, and the newspaper and wire service stories cited in the footnotes 
to this article. 
3. Perpich was Minnesota's governor between December 1976 and December 1978 
but was not elected to that office. He reached it as follows: Wendell Anderson was 
elected governor of Minnesota in 1970 and Perpich was elected lieutenant governor. In 
November 1976, U.S. Senator Walter Mondale (D-Minn.) was elected Vice President of 
the U.S., and on December 29, 1976, Anderson resigned the governorship, which elevated 
Perpich to the governor's office. On December 30, 1976, now-governor Perpich appointed 
Anderson to fill Mondale's U.S. Senate seat. In November 1978, Perpich ran for governor 
against IR candidate Albert Quie. Perpich lost the election. See George Boosey, UPI, 
Oct. 22, 1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ARCHIV File; Biographical Directory 
of the U.S. Congress 1774-1989 (1989). 
4. Hennepin County contains the city of Minneapolis and most of its suburbs. 
5. At this point in the gubernatorial campaign, three polls (a private DFL poll, a 
private IR poll, and the Minnesota poll) all showed Perpich comfortably ahead of 
Whitney. Perpich had apparently been ahead of Whitney in these polls since the Sep-
tember 14 party primaries. DFL polls showed that Perpich's lead had increased from 18 
to 23 to 27 points. A former IR state chairman talked about Minnesota's "love affair" 
with Perpich and predicted that Perpich would win the election. Whitney himself de-
scribed Perpich as a "folk hero." George Boosey, Minnesota Election - Governor's 
3
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attending this meeting was Dan Cohen, a well-known IR sup-
porter and the public relations director for Martin-Williams, the 
advertising agency that was handling the advertising for the 
Whitney campaign. At the meeting, the group decided that Co-
hen should be the one to release the documents because of his 
good rapport with the local media. The group also agreed that 
Cohen should retain anonymity in releasing the documents. Af-
ter the meeting, Cohen contacted four journalists: Lori Sturde-
vant of the Minneapolis Star and Tribune ("Star Tribune"); Bill 
Salisbury of the St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch ("Pioneer 
Press"); Gerry Nelson of the Associated Press; and David Nim-
mer of WCCO Television. Cohen reached all but Nimmer by 
telephone and said: "I have some material which mayor may 
not relate to the upcoming statewide election. And assuming 
that we can reach an agreement as to the basis on which 1 would 
provide this material to you, 1 will provide it."e 
All three reporters agreed to meet with Cohen. Later that 
morning, Cohen met separately with Sturdevant and Salisbury 
in the State Capitol building news office, and made the following 
proposal to each reporter: 
I have some documents which mayor may not re-
late to a candidate in the upcoming election, and 
if you will give me a promise of confidentiality, 
that is that I will be treated as an anonymous 
source, that my name will not appear in any ma-
terial in connection with this, and that you will 
also agree that you're not going to pursue with me 
a question of who my source is, then I will furnish 
you with the documents.' 
Both Sturdevant and Salisbury agreed to Cohen's proposal, 
and Cohen gave each of them copies of the court records. Cohen 
later met separately with Nelson and Nimmer, each of whom 
also agreed to Cohen's proposal, after which Cohen gave each of 
them copies of the court records. 
Of the four reporters, only Sturdevant raised the issue of 
exclusivity with Cohen. After Sturdevant had agreed to Cohen's 
Race, UPI, Oct. 28, 1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ARCHIV File. 
6. Cohen, 445 N.W.2d 248 at 252. 
7.ld. 
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proposal and received the documents, she asked Cohen if he was 
giving the documents to her alone. Cohen said "no" and Sturde-
vant expressed no objection to the lack of exclusivity. 
The Star Tribune, Pioneer Press, Associated Press and 
WCCO-TV handled the information obtained from Cohen and 
their reporters' promises of confidentiality made to Cohen in va-
rious ways. The Star Tribune's actions were similar to those of 
the Pioneer Press. 
On October 27, after Sturdevant and Salisbury met with 
Cohen, both the Star· Tribune and the Pioneer Press interviewed 
Marlene Johnson for her explanation. Johnson explained that 
the unlawful assembly charge resulted from her participation in 
a demonstration at a St. Paul construction site. The demonstra-
tors were protesting the city's alleged failure to hire minority 
workers on construction projects. The unlawful assembly charge 
was dismissed on April 27, 1970, the day Ms. Johnson's father 
died. Johnson explained further that the death of her father had 
left her very upset, and that her emotional distress had led to 
the petty theft (theft up to $150) incident. She stated that in 
May, 1970, while under this emotional distress, she forgot to pay 
for $6 worth of sewing materials at a St. Paul Sears store. The 
. petty theft conviction was vacated in 1971. The court records 
obtained by Cohen did not contain the underlying facts of the 
two criminal charges. 
On the afternoon of October 27, the Star Tribune editorial 
staff met to discuss the story. Sturdevant was not present at the 
meeting and had no input into whether the story was reported. 
The group present at the meeting considered several options. 
One option was not to publish the story on the grounds that the 
Johnson incidents were not newsworthy. However, most editors 
appear to have considered the Johnson incidents newsworthy. 
Further, the Star Tribune had editorially endorsed the Perpich-
Johnson ticket. Some editors feared that if the Star Tribune did 
not print the Johnson story, other media would, leaving the Star 
Tribune open to the charge that it was suppressing information 
damaging to its endorsed ticket. 
A second option explored by Star Tribune editors was to 
publish the information about Johnson's arrest and conviction, 
5
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and to honor Sturdevant's promise to Cohen by describing the 
source of the information either as a source close to the Whitney 
campaign, or a prominent Independent Republican. However, 
some editors argued that Cohen's identity as the source was as 
newsworthy as the Johnson incidents, and that to attribute the 
story to an unidentified source would be misleading. Thus, the 
editors rejected the second option. 
The Star Tribune editors next explored a third option: to 
determine whether Cohen would agree to have his name pub-
lished as part of the Johnson story. The editors asked Sturde-
vant to see if Cohen would release the Star Tribune from its 
promise of confidentiality. Sturdevant strongly objected to the 
breaking of her promise of confidentiality to Cohen, and de-
manded that her name not appear on the article if it were pub-
lished. Sturdevant telephoned Cohen, but he refused to agree to 
the publication of his name. 
In the end, the Star Tribune decided to publish the Johnson 
story, including Cohen's name. Sturdevant telephoned Cohen 
about 7:30 p.m. and informed Cohen of the editors' decision. Co-
hen replied that if his name was to be published, he wanted to 
make the following statement: "The voters of this state are enti-
tled to know that kind of information. Every day Perpich and 
Johnson failed to reveal it to them, they were living a lie."8 
The Pioneer Press editors also discussed the Johnson story. 
Acting independently of the Star Tribune, the Pioneer Press ed-
itors also decided to publish the story, identifying Cohen by 
name. Salisbury, like Sturdevant, objected to the breaking of 
Salisbury's promise of confidentiality to Cohen; however, he did 
not object to his name appearing on the article. 
The Associated Press honored its reporter's promise of con-
fidentiality to Cohen. It published the Johnson story but stated 
that court documents relating to the arrests and conviction 
"were slipped to reporters." WCCO-TV decided not to broadcast 
the story at all. 
On Thursday, October 28, 1982, the Star Tribune published 
8. [d. at 253. 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss2/4
1994] COHEN v. COWLES MEDIA COMPANY 429 
a front page article under the headline "Marlene Johnson arrests 
disclosed by Whitney ally."9 Pursuant to Sturdevant's demand, 
the article was attributed to "Staff Writer." The thirty-three 
paragraph article named Cohen as the source in paragraph one. 
The article described Cohen as "a friend and political associate 
of IR gubernatorial candidate Wheelock Whitney" and "an ad-
vertising executive with Martin-Williams, Inc." The article dis-
closed Johnson's arrests and conviction, along with the mitigat-
ing information provided by Johnson. It included Cohen's 
statement to Sturdevant that "[t]he voters of this state are enti-
tled to know that kind of information. Every day Perpich and 
Johnson failed to reveal it to them, they were living a lie." The 
article noted Cohen's position that the issue he hoped to raise by 
releasing the Cohen records wasn't "whether Johnson had been 
convicted, but whether she tried to conceal it from the public." 
The article then observed that Cohen was a "former Indepen-
dent-Republican alderman in Minneapolis who this year ran un-
successfully for the Hennepin County Board." The article also 
reported Cohen's statement that "when he [Cohen] was arrested 
for scalping a ticket at the Kentucky Derby three years ago, he 
publicized the incident immediately." The article contained a 
photograph of Johnson and a photograph of Cohen. The article 
said that "Cohen took copies of the court records to several news 
organizations. . . ." The article did not mention Sturdevant's 
promise of confidentiality to Cohen. 
That same day the Pioneer Press published an article under 
the headline "Perpich running mate arrested in petty theft case 
in '70."10 The article appeared on the first page of the Pioneer 
Press' local news section. "Bill Salisbury, staff writer" was iden-
tified as the article's author. The nineteen-paragraph article 
named Cohen as the source in paragraph fourteen. There were 
no photographs. The article described Cohen as "a prominent 
Independent Republican" and "a Minneapolis advertising and 
public relations consultant", but did not name Martin-Williams 
as Cohen's employer. The article disclosed Johnson's arrests and 
conviction, along with the mitigating information provided by 
Johnson. It included Cohen's statement that Perpich and John-
son had been "living a lie" by failing to reveal Johnson's arrests 
9. See infra Appendix B, Exhibit 1. 
10. See infra Appendix B, Exhibit 2. 
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to the public. The article also included Cohen's statement that 
the issue was not whether Johnson had been convicted but 
whether she had concealed it. The article said that Cohen "gave 
the court records to at least three reporters, but asked that his 
name not be used." The article did not mention Salisbury's 
promise of confidentiality to Cohen. This was the first time ei-
ther the Star Tribune or the Pioneer Press had ever broken a 
reporter's promise of confidentiality made to a source. 
Later in the day on October 28, after the Star Tribune and 
Pioneer Press articles identifying Cohen and his employment 
appeared, Cohen's employer confronted him. According to Co-
hen, he was fired. According to Cohen's employer, Cohen 
resigned. 
In the days after the original Johnson/Cohen articles of Oc-
tober 28 and before the November 2 election, the Star Tribune 
and Pioneer Press published several items concerning the John-
son/Cohen story. On Friday, October 29, the Star Tribune pub-
lished a commentary by columnist Jim Klobuchar criticizing Co-
hen for unfair campaign tactics. ll On Saturday, October 30 (the 
day before Halloween), the Star Tribune published an editorial 
cartoon in which a trick-or-treater dressed as a garbage can was 
at the door of Perpich headquarters. The garbage can was la-
beled "Last minute campaign smears," and Perpich, standing in 
the doorway looking at the trick-or-treater, was saying "It's Dan 
Cohen."12 
Perpich and Johnson won the election, held on November 2, 
by a fifty-nine to forty-one percent margin.1s After the election, 
the newspapers published further items concerning the Johnson/ 
Cohen story. On Sunday, November 7, the Star Tribune pub-
lished a letter to the editor from Gary Flakne,14 the IR sup-
porter who had originally discovered the Johnson court records. 
The letter criticized the Star Tribune for breaking its reporter's 
promise of confidentiality to Cohen. On the same page, the Star 
Tribune published a column entitled "If you ran the newspa-
per ... ", written by Lou Gelfand, the Star Tribune's "readers' 
11. See infra Appendix B, Exhibit 3. 
12. MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 30, 1982, at lOA. 
13. Gubernatorial Race Results, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1982, at A20. 
14. See Appendix B, Exhibit 4. 
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representative."llj Gelfand's column discussed the decision pro-
cess of the Star Tribune and Pioneer Press editors regarding the 
disclosure of Cohen's name. As to the Star Tribune's confidenti-
ality policy, Gelfand quoted Star Tribune editor Frank Wright 
who said that a Star Tribune reporter should not promise confi-
dentiality to a source without consulting an editor. Gelfand 
wrote that the Star Tribune's editors had published the article 
because the Johnson information was "marginally" newsworthy. 
Further, the editors had several reasons for identifying Cohen. 
One reason was that even though Cohen had asked for confiden-
tiality, many people knew Cohen was the source of the Johnson 
records. A second, closely related reason was that Cohen had 
"openly" supplied the Johnson records to several reporters. In 
the editors' view, "[e]xpecting confidentiality while so brazenly 
distributing the material was ridiculous."16 A third reason was 
that in the editors' view Cohen's action of providing the Johnson 
records so near to the election was itself newsworthy. Gelfand 
stated that had the Star Tribune published the Johnson story 
without identifying the source, the Star Tribune would have en-
dangered its credibility with readers, and that identifying Cohen 
without his consent was justified by "an unspoken standard of 
journalism that defines the substance of Cohen's tip as beneath 
the threshold of acceptable, un attributable information." Gel-
fand concluded by saying that, "If the incident contributes to 
the cleansing of political campaigning, then it will have served a 
purpose." 
That same Sunday, November 7, the Pioneer Press pub-
15. See Appendix B, Exhibit 5. 
16. The Johnson court records were public records, self-authenticating and self-ex-
planatory (although they were not "fully" explanatory because they did not provide the 
underlying facts of the Johnson arrests). The authenticity and meaning of the records 
did not depend on Cohen's identity, and he provided no information beyond the records 
themselves that would give the records any added meaning. Thus, this situation was 
unlike the case where a confidential source provides oral or written information whose 
authenticity or meaning or both depend on the identity of the confidential source. A 
good example of the latter situation is the information regarding the Watergate incident 
provided by "Deep Throat" to Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward. See CARL 
BERNSTEIN AND BOB WOODWARD. ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974). Further, Cohen did 
not attempt to extract a promise to publish the records from any of the journalists he 
spoke to. Thus, one might wonder why Cohen did not just anonymously mail the John-
son court records to the journalists. By an anonymous mailing, it appears that Cohen 
could have achieved the result he intended (informing the journalists of the Johnson 
arrests and thereby providing the opportunity for publication thereoO while completely 
avoiding the risk that his name would be disclosed. 
9
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lished a letter to the editor from Gary Flakne that made the 
same point as Flakne's letter to the Star Tribune, though 
slightly different in text. I7 On the same page, the Pioneer Press 
published a column entitled "Editor's Notebook," written by 
John R. Finnegan, its vice-president and editor.I8 Finnegan's 
column, like Gelfand's, discussed the decision process of the Pio-
neer Press editors regarding the disclosure of Cohen's name. I9 
III. DAN COHEN'S LAWSUIT AGAINST THE STAR 
TRIBUNE AND PIONEER PRESS FOR BREACH OF 
PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
In December 1982, Cohen filed a lawsuit in a Minnesota 
state court against Cowles Media Company (owner of the Star 
Tribune) and Northwest Publications (owner of the Pioneer 
Press). Cohen alleged breach of contract and fraudulent misrep-
resentation, and sought compensatory and punitive damages. 
In July 1988, the case went to trial in Hennepin County 
District Court. The trial court ruled that there was no state ac-
tion and thus rejected the newspapers' argument that the First 
Amendment barred Cohen's lawsuit. The jury found that the 
newspapers had formed contracts with Cohen. The jury con-
cluded that the newspapers had breached these contracts and 
had made misrepresentations to Cohen. The jury awarded Co-
17. See Appendix B, Exhibit 6. 
18. See Appendix B, Exhibit 7. 
19. Finnegan's column stated in part that: 
[Pioneer Press executive editor David] Hall agreed the in-
formation should be published. He believed, however, that the 
source also should be identified. Because of the nature of the 
charge, he felt strongly that the public should be made aware 
of the source. . . . 
[O]ur staff acted in good faith. [Pioneer Press reporter 
Bill] Salisbury made a quick decision that was contrary to the 
newspaper's policy. The decision was reviewed by a senior edi-
tor who decided this was an exceptional case that called for 
overruling the reporter. 
In political campaigns newspapers should rarely accept 
data from sources who are unwilling to be publicly identified 
with charges against opposing candidates. 
There are times when confidentiality must be protected at 
all costs. 
This was not one of them. 
Id. 
10
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hen $200,000 in compensatory damages jointly and severally 
against the two newspapers, and $250,000 in punitive damages 
against each newspaper.20 The newspapers moved for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict or a new triaL The trial court de-
nied these motions and entered judgment for Cohen.21 
The newspapers appealed.22 In a 2-1 decision issued in Sep-
tember 1989, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the com-
pensatory damage award but reversed the punitive damage 
award.23 In an opinion by Judge Short, the appeals court first 
agreed with the trial court that the case did not involve state 
action and thus did not implicate the First Amendment.24 In 
reaching this conclusion, the appeals court reasoned that the 
neutral application of state contract law to private parties is not 
state action.21! Further, it ruled that even if Cohen's lawsuit did 
constitute state action and implicate the First Amendment, the 
newspapers' First Amendment rights were outweighed by the 
state's interest in protecting contract rights;26 that failure to en-
force the promise of confidentiality to Cohen could lead news 
sources to dry up, causing a decrease in newsworthy information 
being published;27 and that in any event, the newspapers had 
20. Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 254; Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 200. 
21. Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 254. 
22. [d. 
23. [d. at 262. 
24. [d. at 254-56. 
25. [d. at 254. 
26. [d. at 256-57. 
27. [d. at 257. In this regard, the appeals court stated that enforcing the promise of 
confidentiality to Cohen would promote the state interests expressed in the Minnesota 
Free Flow of Information Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. 595.021 - 595.025 (West 1988). The pur-
pose section of that Act (595.022) provides that: 
In order to protect the public interest and the free flow of 
information, the news media should have the benefit of a sub-
stantial privilege not to reveal sources of information or to dis-
close unpublished information. To this end, the freedom of 
press requires protection of the confidential relationship be-
tween the news gatherer and the source of information. The 
purpose of [this Act) is to insure and perpetuate, consistent 
with the public interest, the confidential relationship between 
the news media and its sources. 
The Act generally provides that the state of Minnesota (and its political subdivi-
sions) may not compel anyone "gathering, procuring, compiling, editing, or publishing" 
information for the purpose of transmission to the public, to disclose in any proceeding 
the person or means through which his information was acquired. See 595.023. The Act 
provides an exception for criminal cases where 1) there is probable cause to believe that 
the source has information relevant to the commission of a felony, and 2) the informa-
11
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waived any First Amendment rights they may have had to pub-
lish Cohen's name.28 Thus, the First Amendment did not bar 
Cohen's claim. Second, the appeals court ruled that the informa-
tion provided by Cohen constituted consideration; that the con-
tract did not involve a wrongful manipulation of the electoral 
process and so the contract was not void as against public policy; 
and that the contract, though oral, was enforceable under the 
Minnesota statute of frauds. 29 Thus, the compensatory damage 
award for breach of contract was valid.30 Third, the appeals 
court ruled that Cohen had failed to prove fraudulent misrepre-
sentation because the reporters had intended to perform their 
promises of confidentiality.31 Thus, the newspapers had commit-
ted no tort, and the punitive damage award was invalid.32 
Dissenting as to the contract claim, Judge Crippen argued 
that awarding Cohen damages on that claim implicated the First 
Amendment; that this award was not neutral to press freedom; 
that this award unjustifiably intruded on the editorial process 
because the state's interest in enforcing the promise of confiden-
tiality was not compelling; and that the newspapers had not 
waived their First Amendment rights.33 He asserted that "the 
[F]irst [A]mendment guarantees that the press has special im-
munity from officials willing to restrict its freedom,"34 because 
the press keeps government power in check by criticizing gov-
ernment and providing information to the public. "In sum," he 
said, "the publication conduct of the press cannot be governed 
by the courts in the same manner as other conduct is judged."31i 
tion cannot be obtained by any means less destructive of first amendment rights, and 3) 
there is a compelling interest in disclosure and disclosure is needed to prevent injustice. 
See 595.024. The Act also provides an exception for defamation cases where 1) there is 
probable cause to believe that the source has information relevant to the issue of defa-
mation and 2) the information cannot be obtained by any means less destructive of first 
amendment rights. See 595.025. 
State statutes of this type are often called "reporter's shield" laws. A synonym in 
earlier days was "newsman's privilege" laws. See Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, 
Privilege of Newsgatherer Against Disclosure of Confidential Sources or Information, 
99 A.L.R. 3D 37 (1992). 
28. Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 258. 
29. Id. at 262. 
30.Id. 
31. Id. at 259-60. 
32. Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 260. 
33. Id. at 262-68. 
34. Id. at 268. 
35. Id. at 268. 
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The newspapers again appealed. In a 4-2 decision issued in 
July 1990, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the compen-
satory damage award.3s In an opinion by Justice Simonett, the 
court first agreed with the appeals court that Cohen had failed 
to prove fraudulent misrepresentation and thus that the puni-
tive damage award was invalid.37 Second, the court ruled that a 
source and a reporter do not ordinarily believe that a promise of 
confidentiality is a legally binding contract; rather, both parties 
understand that such a promise is given as a moral commit-
ment.3S Thus, the reporters' promises of confidentiality to Cohen 
did not constitute contracts. Third, the court addressed whether 
Cohen might have a promissory estoppel claim.39 The court 
found that the reporters made a promise of confidentiality to 
Cohen; that the reporters expected that promise to induce Co-
hen to provide the Johnson records; and that he had provided 
those records to his detriment.4o However, the court found 
troublesome promissory estoppel's requirement that injustice 
can be avoided only by enforcing the promise.41 The court stated 
that resolving that issue inevitably implicated the First Amend-
ment, because "[i]n deciding whether it would be unjust not to 
enforce the promise, the court must necessarily weigh the same 
considerations that are weighed for whether the First Amend-
ment has been violated."42 This would require the court to bal-
ance the newspapers' First Amendment right to publish against 
Cohen's common law interest in enforcing the promise of confi-
dentiality. The court reasoned that a newspaper's process of 
choosing what to publish is a process that is critical to press 
freedom; that the promises of confidentiality to Cohen arose in 
"the classic First Amendment context of the quintessential pub-
lic debate in our democratic society, namely, a political source 
36. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990). 
37. [d. at 202. 
38. [d. at 203. 
39. [d. at 203-04; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 90(1) (1981) provides in rel-
evant part that "[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce 
action . . . on the part of the promisee . . . and which does induce such action . . . is 
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy 
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires." 
The promissory estoppel theory apparently had not been addressed in the trial court 
or the appellate briefs; a state Supreme Court Justice raised the issue during oral argu-
ment. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 204 n.5. 
40. [d. at 204. 
41. [d. 
42. [d. at 205. 
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involved in a political campaign";43 and that awarding damages 
for breach of the promise of confidentiality to Cohen would chill 
public debate and violate the newspapers' First Amendment 
rights. The court noted that cases may exist where the govern-
ment's interest in enforcing a promise of confidentiality out-
weighs the press' First Amendment rights, but that this was not 
such a case. 
Justice Yetka's dissent argued that the court majority had 
"carve[d] out yet another special privilege in favor of the press 
that is denied other citizens. "44 He asserted that the press 
should be required, like anyone else, to keep its promises."!! He 
asserted further that the newspapers here should have either not 
promised confidentiality to Cohen, or having promised confiden-
tiality, either not published the Johnson story at all or published 
it without disclosing Cohen's identity.4s He argued that failing to 
enforce the promise to Cohen had two negative effects. First, it 
would dry up sources, thus denying the public information far 
more important than the information about Johnson's minor of-
fenses. 4 ? Second, it violated the rule of equality under the law.4s 
Finally, he suggested that the press had been hypocritical, by 
demanding confidentiality when it does not want to reveal confi-
dential sources, yet violating confidentiality agreements when 
doing so would make a story more sensational and profitable.49 
Justice Kelley's dissent agreed with Justice Yetka's that the 
court majority had given the press unjustified special treatment, 
and likewise suggested that the press was being hypocritical.l!O 
43. [d. 
44. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 205. 
45. [d. 
46. [d. at 205-06. 
47. [d. at 206. 
48. [d. 
49. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 206. 
50. [d. at 206-07. In a footnote, Justice Kelley stated in part that: 
These media defendants now advance a First Amendment ar-
gument based upon the "public's right to know." I suggest to 
do 80 is indeed ironical when considered in the light of the 
extensive efforts of each to promote enactment of Minnesota 
Statutes Sections 595.021 to 595.025, the Minnesota Free Flow 
of Information Act, sometimes popularly referred to as the Re-
porter's Shield Act. 
Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 207 n.!. The provisions of the Minnesota Free Flow of Informa-
tion Act are summarized at supra note 27. 
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Justice Kelley argued that the First Amendment had nothing to 
do with the case, and agreed with Justice Yetka that the major-
ity's decision would dry up sources, thus inhibiting rather than 
promoting the First Amendment's goals.1I1 
The United States Supreme Court granted Cohen's request 
for certiorari. In June 1991, the court ruled 5-4 in an opinion by 
Justice White that the First Amendment did not bar Cohen 
from proceeding against the newspapers on a promissory estop-
pel theory, and thus reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court's 
decision.1I2 First, the court ruled that the application of state 
rules of law in state courts in a way that allegedly restricts First 
Amendment rights constitutes state action. liS Therefore, Cohen's 
promissory estoppel claim involved state action implicating the 
First Amendment. Second, the court asserted that two alterna-
tive lines of cases involving press freedom exist.1I4 The first line 
of cases holds that if the press lawfully acquires truthful infor-
mation about a matter of public importance, then under the 
First Amendment, the government may not punish publication 
of that information unless such punishment is "need[ed] to fur-
ther a state interest of the highest order."1I1I The second line of 
51. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 206-207. 
52. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). 
53. Id. at 2517-18. 
54. Id. at 2518. 
55. Id. at 2518 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 
(1979». After stating this rule, the court identified three decisions as being in this first 
line of cases: Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979), The Florida Star v. 
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) and Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 
829 (1978). The court described these as cases that held insufficient the asserted govern-
ment interest in preventing publication of truthful, lawfully acquired information. 
In Smith, a West Virginia statute made it a crime for a newspaper to publish, with-
out juvenile court approval, the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender. Two 
local newspapers obtained the name of a juvenile homicide defendant by listening to the 
police band radio frequency and interviewing eyewitnesses. The newspapers published 
the juvenile's name without juvenile court approval, and were indicted for violating the 
statute. The U.S. Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional, ruling that the First 
Amendment barred the government from punishing a newspaper for truthful publication 
of an alleged juvenile offender's name, lawfully acquired, because press freedom out-
weighed the state's interest in protecting the anonymity of juvenile defendants. The 
court suggested that since the statute applied only to newspapers, it was underinclusive. 
Further, the court noted that many states had found ways to achieve anonymity of juve-
nile defendants without imposing criminal penalties on the press (such as cooperation 
between juvenile courts and newspaper editors), suggesting that the statutory purposes 
could be achieved with means other than criminal liability that were less restrictive of 
press freedom. Smith, 443 U.S. at 103. 
In Florida Star, a Florida statute made it a crime for any instrument of mass com-
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cases holds that a generally applicable law does not violate the 
First Amendment if. its enforcement against the press has 
merely incidental effects on the press' ability to gather and re-
port news. lie The court ruled that this case was controlled by the 
second line of cases. The court reasoned that state promissory 
estoppel law is a law of general applicability that does not target 
the press; that imposing liability on the newspapers here for 
breach of promise would not punish them for publishing lawfully 
obtained truthful information because compensatory damages 
munication to publish or broadcast the name of a sexual offense victim. A local newspa-
per obtained the name of a rape victim by reading a publicly available police report. The 
newspaper published the rape victim's name, and she sued the newspaper in a state 
court, alleging that the newspaper had negligently violated the statute. The U.S. Su-
preme Court, relying on Smith, ruled that the First Amendment barred the imposition of 
damages on the newspaper. The court stated that since the statute applied only to in-
struments of mass communication, it was underinclusive. Further, the court suggested 
that the statutory purposes could be achieved with means other than civil liability that 
were less restrictive of press freedom. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 524. 
In Landmark Communications, a Virginia statute made it a crime to divulge infor-
mation regarding proceedings before a state judicial review commission that was author-
ized to hear complaints about state judges' disability or misconduct. A local newspaper 
published an article that reported on a pending inquiry by the commission and identified 
the judge whose conduct was being investigated. The newspaper was convicted of violat-
ing the statute. The U.S. Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional, ruling that 
the First Amendment barred the government from punishing third persons who were 
strangers to confidential commission proceedings for divulging truthful information re-
garding such proceedings, because freedom of speech outweighed the state's interest in 
protecting the reputation of judges or the institutional reputation of courts. Landmark 
Communications, 435 U.S. at 829. 
56. Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2518. After stating this rule, the court identified eight deci-
sions as being in this second line of cases: Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (hold-
ing that the First Amendment does not relieve a reporter of the citizen's obligation to 
respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant to a criminal investiga-
tion, even though the reporter might be required to reveal a confidential source); 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that the First 
Amendment does not immunize the press from the application of the copyright laws); 
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (holding that the the First Amendment 
does not immunize the press from the application of the National Labor Relations Act); 
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (holding that the First 
Amendment does not immunize the press from the application of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act); Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1 (1945) and Citizen Publishing Co. v. 
U.S., 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment does not immunize the 
press from the application of the antitrust laws); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 
(1943) (holding that a city ordinance imposing a license tax on people distributing reli-
gious material door-to-door violated the First Amendment, but stating in dictum that 
the press is not "free from all financial burdens of government") and Minneapolis Star 
and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (holding 
that a use tax on the cost of paper and ink products used in producing publications 
violated the First Amendment, but stating in dictum that the government can subject 
newspapers to generally applicable economic regulations). 
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are not punishment; and that cases like The Florida Star u. 
B.J.F.67 and Smith u. Daily Mail Publishing CO.68 are distin-
guishable. In those cases, said the Court, the state itself defined 
the content of publications that would trigger liability, whereas 
here, Minnesota law merely required a promisor to perform his 
promise, the parties themselves had determined their legal obli-
gations, and any limits which the Minnesota courts might place 
on the newspapers' publication of truthful information were im-
posed by the newspapers themselves.69 Further, the court rea-
soned that it was not even clear that the newspapers had ob-
tained Cohen's name lawfully (at least for purposes of 
publishing it) because the newspapers obtained his name only 
by making a promise which they did not honor.eo In short, "the 
First Amendment does not confer on the press a constitutional 
right to disregard promises that would otherwise be enforced 
under state law."e1 Having decided that the second line of cases 
controlled, the First Amendment did not bar Cohen's lawsuit. 
Finally, the court declined Cohen's request to reinstate the 
jury's compensatory damage award.s2 Instead, the court ruled 
that the Minnesota Supreme Court's false conclusion that the 
First Amendment barred Cohen's lawsuit may have limited its 
consideration of whether Cohen had otherwise proved a promis-
sory estoppel claim sufficient to support the jury's compensatory 
damage award. The court further ruled that the Minnesota Con-
stitution might be construed to bar Cohen's promissory estoppel 
claim against the newspapers. Thus the court remanded the case 
to the Minnesota Supreme Court for reconsideration of the 
promissory estoppel claim under state law.S3 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Souter, 
argued in dissent that Cohen's lawsuit should be controlled by 
the first line of cases. Under that line of cases, irpposing liability 
against the newspapers here for breach of promise did constitute 
punishment for the publication of lawfully obtained, truthful in-
formation, without a compelling government interest.e" Justice 
57. 491 U.S. 524 (1989); see supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
58. 443 U.S. 97 (1979); see supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
59. Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2519. 
60. Id. at 2519. 
61. Id. 
62.Id. 
63. Id. at 2520. 
64. Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2520-22. 
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Souter's separate dissent largely paralleled that of Justice Black-
mun. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor joined Justice 
Souter's dissent.611 
In January 1992, on remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
unanimously ruled in an opinion by Justice Simonett that the 
jury's compensatory damage award was sustainable on a promis-
sory estoppel theory and affirmed that award.66 In reaching its 
conclusion, the court found that Cohen's failure to plead promis-
sory estoppel before or during the trial did not bar him from 
pursuing that theory now; that under the Minnesota Constitu-
tion's free speech provision and Minnesota public policy, the 
newsworthiness of Cohen's identity was not so important as to 
require the invalidation of the promise of confidentiality; that 
Cohen had proved the elements of promissory estoppel; and that 
the evidence presented at trial, combined with the trial court's 
jury instructions, were sufficient to sustain the jury's compensa-
tory damage award.67 
IV. THE SURVEY68 
A. SURVEY PURPOSES AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The survey had three purposes'. They were to identify prac-
tices in the newspaper industry and attitudes of newspaper edi-
tors regarding promises of confidentiality after Cohen, to com-
pare those practices and attitudes with those referred to in the 
various Cohen decisions, and to ascertain whether the Cohen 
case has had any impact on newspaper policies. 
Subjects to be interviewed by telephone were identified by 
using a random number table to select fifty newspapers from a 
directory.69 Preliminary investigation revealed there are approxi-
mately 1600 daily newspapers and 3600 weekly newspapers in 
the United States, about twice as many weekly newspapers as 
65. [d. at 2522-23. For further discussion of Justice Blackmun's dissent and Justice 
Souter's dissent, see infra text accompanying notes 113-117. 
66. Cohen, 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992). 
67. [d. at 390-92. 
68. The complete results of the survey are reported in Appendix A. The survey 
questions are set forth in Appendix C. 
69. 1992 GALE DIRECTORY OF PUBLICATIONS AND BROADCAST MEDIA (Julie Win-
klepleck ed., 124th ed. 1991.) 
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dailies. The initial selection process produced a sample of thirty-
eight weeklies, eight dailies, and four others (one bi-monthly, 
one daily Monday through Friday, one bi-weekly and one tri-
weekly), and only one newspaper with a circulation over 100,000. 
To obtain a sample that was more representative of the two-to-
one ratio of weeklies to dailies in the United States, additional 
random number tables were used to select six (of ninety-one) 
dailies with circulation 100,000-500,000, two (of fifteen) dailies 
with circulation 500,000-1,000,000 and one daily (of five) with 
circulation greater than 1,000,000.70 The final sample consisted 
of seventeen dailies, thirty-eight weeklies, and four others, a to-
tal of fifty-nine newspapers.71 
Attempts were made to contact all fifty-nine by telephone. 
Three publications (all from the West) had gone out of business. 
Despite obviously demanding schedules, fifty-one editors partici-
pated in the telephone survey, a response rate of eighty-six per-
cent. As a whole the editors were thoughtful, sincere and articu-
late, and showed genuine interest and concern for the issues. 
The survey results reveal that for most respondents,72 few 
sources ask for confidentiality (Table VII). About twenty per-
cent of the interviewees said that less than one percent of their 
newspaper's sources ask for confidentiality. About forty-two per-
cent of the interviewees said that less than five percent of their 
newspaper's sources ask for confidentiality. And about eighteen 
percent of the interviewees said that less than ten percent of 
their newspaper's sourc~s ask for confidentiality (Table VII). 
Those sources who ask are promised confidentiality a relatively 
small percent of the time (Table IX). Some respondents almost 
routinely deny such requests and others treat requests on a case 
by case basis (Table IX). While there is general agreement on 
what a promise of confidentiality means, that meaning is rather 
70. From the "Top 100 U.S. Daily Newspapers" list in THE WORLD ALMANAC & 
BOOK OF FACTS 1992 (Mark S. Hoffman ed. 1991). 
71. The final sample included publications representing many facets of society: the 
GREENWOOD DEMOCRAT (Greenwood, Arkansas) and the WAPELLO REPUBLICAN (Wapello, 
Iowa); the WEST TEXAS CATHOLIC; the MOBILE BEACON (Mobile, Alabama)(a black com-
munity newspaper); and ADVERTISING AGE. Publications located in the East, South, Mid-
west and West were represented. 
72. Hereafter, the term "respondent" means respondent newspaper. When appropri-
ate, we shall use the term "interviewee" to refer to the individual editors whom we 
interviewed. 
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vague and unsophisticated (Table VIII). Over sixty percent of 
respondents have a policy for reporters about making promises 
of confidentiality (Table X). Only two such policies are written 
(Table XI). Fifty percent of respondents require reporters to get 
an editor's approval before making a promise of confidentiality, 
while twenty-five percent of respondents give reporters author-
ity to make promises of confidentiality (Table XII). About fifty-
three percent of respondents had reviewed their policy for re-
porters within the past five years, while about forty-one percent 
had not (Table XIII). About one-fourth of respondents (27.5%) 
had a policy about editors overriding a reporter's promise of 
confidentiality (Table XIV). None of such policies are written 
(Table XV). Only one policy gave editors authority and permis-
sion to override a reporter's promise of confidentiality (Table 
XVI). Six respondents reviewed this policy within the last five 
years, while seven did not (Table XVII). Six respondents had 
reviewed their reporter and/or editor policies on confidentiality 
because of the Cohen case, while five respondents had conducted 
such reviews for other reasons (Table XVIII). Only seventeen in-
terviewees (one-third) knew about the Cohen case (Table XX). 
Of those seventeen, three said their newspapers had become in-
formed of the Cohen case through a professional journal, and 
four said their newspapers had become informed of the case 
from their attorney. Ten interviewees did not respond to this 
question (Table XIX). The interviewees had a variety of opin-
ions about the likely effect (if any) of the Cohen case on the 
newspaper industry. About a fifth of the interviewees thought 
more reporters would be required to get their editor's approval 
before making a promise of confidentiality, and about a fifth 
thought the case would have very little effect (Table XXI). Al-
most three-fourths of the interviewees did not think sources 
would dry up even if Cohen had lost his case (Table XXII). And 
a little over seventy percent of the interviewees thought that the 
Cohen case's effect on editors' First Amendment freedom was 
either not serious or somewhat serious. Only about eight percent 
of the interviewees thought the case's effect on such freedom 
was very serious (Table XXIII). 
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B. COMPARISON OF SURVEY RESULTS WITH VIEWS EXPRESSED BY 
THE JUDGES IN THE VARIOUS COHEN DECISIONS73 
. 
While the United States Supreme Court decision did not di· 
rectly address confidentiality practices of the newspaper indus-
try or speculate on the likely effects of its decision on such prac-
tices, both the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision74 and the 
1990 Minnesota Supreme Court decision did.711 In addition, all 
three court decisions addressed the First Amendment implica-
tions of the Cohen case. 
1. The View that Not Enforcing the Newspapers' Promises of 
Confidentiality to Cohen Would Cause Sources to Dry Up 
Judge Short, writing for the majority of the state court of 
appeals, stated that if the court did not enforce the newspapers' 
promises of confidentiality to Cohen, then "confidential sources 
would have no legal recourse against unscrupulous reporters or 
editors. Ultimately, news sources could dry up, resulting in less 
newsworthy information to publish."76 Justice Simonett, writing 
for the majority of the state supreme court in that court's 1990 
decision, discussed this idea as well, stating that "if it is known 
that promises will not be kept, sources may dry up. "77 The dis-
sents of both Justice Yetka and Justice Kelley likewise ex-
pressed this idea.78 It would seem logical that if the case was 
decided in favor of the newspapers, this would send a message to 
sources that newspapers have nothing to fear from breaking 
promises of confidentiality. And if newspapers may break their 
promises of confidentiality with impunity they may break them 
more often. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court's 1990 deci-
sion did find for the newspapers and thus the fear of sources 
drying up obviously was not an overriding concern. 
The survey data do not support the view that if Cohen had 
73. The term "judges" here includes the Justices of the Minnesota and U.S. Su-
preme Courts. 
74. Cohen, 445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. App. 1989). 
75. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990). 
76. Cohen, 445 N.W.2d at 257. 
77. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 203. 
78. [d. at 205-07. 
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lost the case, confidential sources would dry Up.79 Only seven in-
terviewees (13.7%) thought that had the newspapers won, their 
confidential sources would dry up. Thirty-seven interviewees 
(72.5 %) thought there would be no drying up, and five inter-
viewees (9.8%) thought that drying up was possible but not 
likely (Table XXII). Justice Simonett's observation in the Min-
nesota Supreme Court's 1990 Cohen decision that "[t]he source, 
for whatever reasons, wants certain information published"80 
was also expressed by many interviewees. The interviewees 
seemed to think that a court decision for the newspapers in the 
Cohen case would not be an overriding concern to a source who 
was intent on getting information printed, even if such a court 
decision were generally known. And the interviewees thought 
that their sources, most of whom are neither lawyers nor jour-
nalists, would not be aware of the Cohen case anyway. So it 
would seem that a concern that "the consequences of this deci-
sion [are] deplorable ... potential news sources will now be re-
luctant to give information to reporters"81 is unwarranted. 
2. The View that Breaking the Newspapers' Promises of Con-
fidentiality to Cohen Would Be Unethical 
In support of the Minnesota Supreme Court's 1990 holding 
that a reporter's promise of confidentiality to a source is not a 
contract, Justice Simonett noted that "[t]he record is replete 
with the unanimous testimony of reporters, editors and journal-
ism experts that protecting a confidential source of a news story 
is a sacred trust, a matter of 'honor', of 'morality', and required 
by professional ethics."82 Justice Simonett then distinguished. a 
79. See infra Appendix A, Table XXII. 
80. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 203. 
81. [d. at 206 (Yetka, J. dissenting). 
82. [d. at 202. At least two codes of ethics for journalists exist. The American Soci-
ety of Newspaper Editors ("ASNE"), founded in 1922, adopted the Canons of Journal-
ism that same year. This code was replaced by a Statement of Principles in 1975. The 
Society of Professional Journalists ("SPJ"), founded in 1909 as Sigma Delta Chi and 
operating under its current name since 1988, adopted a Code of Ethics in 1926; the latest 
revision was adopted in 1987. Compliance with both the ASNE and SPJ ethics codes is 
voluntary. 
The ASNE ethics code's provision on confidentiality states that, "Pledges of confi-
dentiality to news sources must be honored at all costs, and therefore should not be 
given lightly. Unless there is clear and pressing need to maintain confidences, sources of 
information should be identified." ASNE Statement of Principles, Article VI, captioned 
"Fair Play." 
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moral and ethical obligation from a contract, and characterized a 
promise of confidentiality as an "'I'll-scratch-your-back-if-
you'll-scratch-mine' accommodation" where "[t]he durability 
and duration of the confidence is usually left unsaid, dependent 
on unfolding developments ... [where] [e]ach party ... as-
sumes the risks of what might happen, protected only by the 
good faith of the other party."83 
The survey results agree with the testimony of people from 
the industry mentioned by Justice Simonett.8• Of the fourteen 
respondents that had policies about editor overrides, only one 
such policy gave the editor the final say, that is, sanctioned an 
editor override. All other responses (editor must honor the re-
porter's promise; editor has authority to override but would ei-
ther honor the promise or not print the story; editor would ei-
ther honor the promise or print a story but not use the 
information supplied by the confidential source) reflect the atti-
tude that breaking the promise would be unethical. The main 
reason so few respondents had editor policies in the first place 
was that most of the respondents' policies for reporters required 
reporters to obtain the editor's approval before making a prom-
ise of confidentiality; therefore, a separate policy for editors was 
considered unnecessary. . 
3. The View that the Newspapers had Alternatives to Print-
ing Cohen's Name and the Meaning of a Reporter's Promise 
of Confidentiality to a Source . 
In the Minnesota Supreme Court's 1990 Cohen decision, a 
factor mentioned by Justice Simonett in discussing the contract 
and promissory estoppel aspects of the case and an important 
consideration in Justice Yetka's dissent was that alternatives to 
printing Cohen's name were available to the editors.811 For in-
stance, the Star Tribune and Pioneer Press could have described 
Cohen's job more or less obliquely, known as "background." Al-
The SPJ ethics code's provision on confidentiality states that, "Journalists acknowl-
edge the newsman's ethic of protecting confidential sources of information." SPJ Code of 
Ethics, [section) III, captioned "Ethics." CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Rena 
A. Gorlin ed., second ed. 1990). 
83. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 203. 
84. See infra Appendix A, Table XVI. 
85. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 205-06. 
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ternatively, the newspapers could have indicated merely that the 
Johnson information came from someone supporting the oppos-
ing candidate. Justice Simonett alluded to the fact that since the 
newspapers in the Cohen case had options available to them 
which they chose not to use, it could be argued that they were 
not altogether blameless. He implied that the newspapers' be-
havior would have to be considered in applying promissory es-
toppel since this legal theory requires that granting a remedy be 
the only way to avoid injustice.86 Justice Yetka saw the newspa-
pers' breaking the promise rather than using an available alter-
native as irresponsible and the decision for the newspapers as 
endorsing, perhaps even encouraging, an irresponsible press.87 
This issue ultimately relates to the question of what a 
promise of confidentiality means. A case addressing the ambigu-
ity involved when journalists make promises of confidentiality to 
sources is Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc. 88 
86. [d. at 204-05. Since promissory estoppel is an equitable remedy, equitable max· 
ims apply. Such maxims include the requirements that one seeking an equitable remedy 
must himself "do equity" and must have "clean hands." In the words of a 1929 Minne-
sota Supreme Court decision: 
The equity rules, that he who seeks equity must do equity and 
that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands, 
are recognized and followed by all the courts. . . . These rules 
or maxims operate to deny relief to or from conduct which is 
fraudulent, illegal or unconscionable. The misconduct need 
not be of such a nature as to be actually fraudulent or consti-
tute a basis for legal action. The plaintiff may be denied relief 
where his conduct has been unconscionable by reason of a bad 
motive, or where the result induced by his conduct will be un-
conscionable either in the benefit to himself or the injury to 
others. 
Johnson v. Freberg, 228 N.W. 159, 160 (Minn. 1929). See generally DAN B. DOBBS. LAW 
OF REMEDIES 2.3(4) at 83 and 2.4(2) (2d ed. 1993). 
87. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 205-06. 
88. Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, 733 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Minn. 1990); Ru-
zicka, 939 F. 2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991); Ruzicka, 794 F. Supp. 303 (D. Minn. 1992); Ruzicka, 
999 F. 2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1993). Both the Cohen and Ruzicka cases arose from events that 
happened in Minnesota in the 1980s, and involved a news source suing a publisher for 
breach of a promise of confidentiality. The Cohen case proceeded through the Minnesota 
state courts at the same time that the Ruzicka case (a diversity action) was proceeding 
through the federal courts. Both cases involved Minnesota and First Amendment law. 
Both cases had several appeals. The federal courts' Ruzicka decisions relied extensively 
on the Cohen decisions, with each Ruzicka decision citing the latest Cohen decision. In 
addition, the Minnesota Supreme Courts' July 1990 and January 1992 Cohen decisions 
briefly mentioned the latest Ruzicka decision. 
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In 1981, Jill Ruzicka sued her psychiatrist, charging him 
with sexually abusing her during therapy. She also sued the 
Minnesota Board of Medical Examiners for its alleged failure to 
supervise the psychiatrist properly. In 1987, writer Claudia Drei-
fus contracted with Conde Nast, publisher of Glamour maga-
zine, to write an article about therapist-patient sexual abuse. In 
preparing the article, Dreifus contacted a Minneapolis counsel-
ing center and asked to interview patients who had been sexu-
ally abused by their therapists. Ruzicka, a patient at the center, 
told Dreifus she would agree to be interviewed only if she was 
not "identified or identifiable" in the article.89 Dreifus promised 
to mask Ruzicka's identity. Before publication, Dreifus called 
Ruzicka and read her a draft of the article. The draft did not 
attribute Ruzicka's story to anyone by name, but attributed the 
story to someone in "a midwestern city." The draft also did not 
mention Ruzicka's service on a Minnesota task force on thera-
pist-patient sexual abuse. Dreifus told her the draft would be 
edited before publication. 
Dreifus' article was published in the September 1988 issue 
of Glamour. The article referred to Ruzicka as "Jill Lundquist," 
described her experience of abuse, mentioned her lawsuits 
against her psychiatrist and the state medical board, said she 
was a Minneapolis attorney, and mentioned her membership on 
the state task force on sexual abuse. The article said that the 
real names of the patients and abusing doctors had been 
changed. 
In October 1988, Ruzicka filed a diversity action against 
Conde Nast in the federal district court for the district of Min-
nesota, alleging breach of contract and other state law claims. 
During discovery, Ruzicka stated that she did not know anyone 
89. Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1291. Ruzicka's name had been publicized earlier in 
connection with the alleged sexual abuse. A 1981 Star Tribune article reported Ruzicka's 
lawsuits against her psychiatrist and the state medical board. The article included her 
name, her age, her employment with the County Attorney's office, and her allegations 
against the psychiatrist. A 1982 Star Tribune article also named Ruzicka ~nd described 
her allegations. In 1984, Ruzicka was appointed to a Minnesota task force on therapist-
patient sexual abuse, and the Star Tribune reported the appointment. A 1984 Pioneer 
Press article named Ruzicka as a victim of therapist abuse. Also in 1984, Ruzicka testi-
fied at a public hearing before the Minnesota legislature about her abuse. In 1986, Ru-
zicka discussed her abuse at a national conference on sexual exploitation. The Star Trib-
une did not name her but reported her comments at the conference. Ruzicka, 939 F. 2d 
at 580 n.3. 
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who identified her from the Glamour article, except for two of 
her former therapists, both of whom had extensive prior knowl-
edge of her history of abuse.90 In March 1990, the district court 
granted summary judgment to Conde Nast on all of Ruzicka's 
claims.91 The district court, applying Minnesota law, observed 
that the Minnesota Court of Appeals' Cohen decision92 had up-
held a source's claim for breach of promise of confidentiality. 
However, the district court concluded that it was not bound by 
state court decisions on federal constitutional issues and that it 
was required to make an independent examination of the First 
Amendment issues raised by Ruzicka's claims. The district court 
found that Dreifus "is alleged to have agreed not to identify 
[Ruzicka] or make her 'identifiable' "; that" [Ruzicka] was not 
identified"; and therefore that "[Ruzicka] can only claim that 
the information published in the article made her 'identifi-
able' ".93 The court observed that "reporter-source agreements 
tend to be oral and indefinite," and that "[t]he vagueness of [re-
porter-source] agreements may often leave uncertainty as to 
what the terms of the agreement require."94 The district court 
held that when a source sues to enforce a reporter-source agree-
ment, the First Amendment requires the source, "at a minimum 
... to prove specific, unambiguous terms and to provide clear 
and convincing proof that the agreement was breached."911 The 
district court found that Ruzicka had not met this burden, rea-
soning that "[w]here the agreement between a reporter and a 
source requires that the source not be made identifiable, with no 
further particulars or specific facts about what information 
would identify the source to the relevant audience, the agree-
ment is too ambiguous to be enforced. "96 The district court 
therefore granted summary judgment to Conde Nast on Ru-
zicka's contract claim, as well as her other c1aims.97 
90. Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. 1289, 1292 (D. Minn. 1990). 
91. Id. at 1301-02. 
92. In March 1990, the Minnesota Court of Appeals' Cohen decision, 445 N.W.2d 
248 (Minn. App. 1989), was the only reported decision in the Cohen case. The federal 
district court noted that a petition for review had been granted in Cohen in October 
1989. Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1294. 
93. Ruzicka, 733 F. Supp. at 1298. 
94. Id. at 1300. 
95.Id. 
96. Id. at 1300-01. 
97. Id. at 1301-02. With respect to Ruzicka's contract claim, the court contrasted 
Cohen by describing the reporters' promise to Cohen as clear. "In Cohen, the terms of 
the [Star Tribune's and Pioneer Press') purported waiver [of First Amendment rights) 
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Ruzicka appealed. D8 In July 1991, the federal appeals court, 
following the reasoning of the state supreme court's first Cohen 
decision and the U.S. Supreme Court's Cohen decision,DD af-
firmed the district court's decision that Minnesota law. barred 
Ruzicka's contract claim, but remanded Ruzicka's case to the 
district court for consideration of her promissory estoppel 
claim. 10o The federal appeals court also affirmed the district 
court's decision granting summary judgment to Conde Nast on 
Ruzicka's other state law claims.IOl 
After the remand order, the Minnesota Supreme Court is-
sued its January 1992 Cohen decision, which ruled that the 
jury's damage award to Cohen was sustainable on a promissory 
estoppel theory. In May 1992, on remand in Ruzicka, the federal 
district court applied promissory estoppel theory in light of the 
state supreme court's January 1992 Cohen decision and granted 
summary judgment to Conde Nast on the promissory estoppel 
claim.I02 In granting summary judgment, the district court found 
that Dreifus's promise not to make Ruzicka identifiable was in-
sufficiently clear and definite to support recovery under promis-
sory estoppel, and that "[f]ar from preventing injustice, enforc-
ing such an ambiguous promise could create injustice by placing 
on editors and reporters the impossible burden of guessing at 
what steps such a promise requires. II103 Therefore Ruzicka could 
not establish a promissory estoppel claim. 104 
Ruzicka again appealed. In August 1993, the federal appeals 
court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to 
seem clear. The reporters agreed not to publish the fact that Cohen was the source of the 
information concerning the candidate for lieutenant governor." [d. at 1298. 
98. While Ruzicka's appeal was pending before the federal appeals court, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court issued its first Cohen decision and the U.S. Supreme Court issued 
its Cohen decision, remanding the Cohen case to the state supreme court for further 
consideration of Cohen's promissory estoppel theory. 
99. Cohen, 111 S.Ct. 2513. 
100. Ruzicka, 939 F. 2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991). Ruzicka, like Dan Cohen, had not origi-
nally pled a promissory estoppel theory. However, apparently based on developments in 
the Cohen case, she raised that theory on appeal. The federal appeals court ruled that 
although it normally does not consider new claims advanced on appeal, it would allow 
Ruzicka's promissory estoppel claim to proceed because that claim was in the same pos-
ture as Cohen's promissory estoppel claim. [d. at 582. 
101. [d. at 583. 
102. Ruzicka, 794 F. Supp. 303 (D. Minn. 1992). 
103. [d . . at 311. 
104. [d. at 309-11. 
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Conde Nast and remanded the case for trial on a promissory es-
toppel theory. 1011 The appeals court first noted that the parties 
disagreed about what Dreifus had promised: "Ruzicka contends 
that Dreifus promised that she would not be 'identified or iden-
tifiable' in the article. Dreifus, however, claims that she vaguely 
promised only to do some masking."106 Second, 'the appeals 
court ruled that under summary judgment rules, it was required 
to review the evidence of the alleged promise in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party (Ruzicka), and thus it as-
sumed that Dreifus had promised not to make Ruzicka identi-
fied or identifiable. l07 Third, the appeals court agreed with the 
district court that since the article had changed Ruzicka's sur-
name to Lundquist, Dreifus had performed her promise not to 
identify Ruzicka. Finally, however, the appeals court ruled that 
the district court had erred in holding the term "identifiable" to 
be vague; instead, the appeals court found that Dreifus's prom-
ise not to make Ruzicka identifiable was sufficiently clear to 
raise a factual question as to whether Ruzicka could recover 
under promissory estoppel. l08 
The survey results indicate that promises of confidentiality 
are potentially vague in that several promises could be meant: a 
promise simply not to divulge the source's name in a newspaper 
article; a promise not to divulge the source's name to anyone; a 
promise not to divulge the source's name even in court; a prom-
ise not to use the source's name but a reservation of the right to 
describe the source's position (background).109 In response to the 
question, "If you give a promise of confidentiality, what does 
that mean you can/cannot do?," almost seventy-four percent of 
the interviewees said such a promise constituted either a prom-
ise simply not to divulge the source's name in a newspaper arti-
cle, or a promise not to divulge the source's name to anyone (Ta-
ble VIII). Only two of the respondents actively negotiate with 
sources about whether the newspaper may disclose the source's 
name in court despite the fact that there have been numerous 
criminal and libel cases involving this issue. Only interviewees 
105. Ruzicka, 999 F. 2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1993). 
106. [d. at 1320. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. at 1320-23. 
109. As the Ruzicka case, discussed supra, demonstrated, even further ambiguities 
are possible in reporter-source agreements involving confidentiality. 
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who had worked in Washington, D.C. immediately talked about 
the possible alternative types of confidentiality: off the record 
(the newspaper will only print the information obtained from 
the source if that information is obtained from an independent 
source), deep background (the newspaper will print such infor-
mation but without any attribution, as if within the reporter's 
own personal knowledge), background (the newspaper will print 
such information with veiled attribution, such as a description of 
the source's position, but will not print the source's name), and 
on the record (the newspaper will print the information along 
with the source's name).110 
The Ruzicka case and the survey are evidence that promises 
of confidentiality are often vague. But the Eighth Circuit's Ru-
zicka decision shows that vagueness may not prevent enforce-
ability under promissory estoppel. 
4. The View that Imposing Damages on the Newspapers in 
the Cohen Case Would Violate the Press' First Amendment 
Rights and Chill the Newsgathering Process 
The dissenting judge in the Minnesota Court of Appeals' 
decision, and the 1990 Minnesota Supreme Court majority, ex-
pressed the opinion that imposing damages on the newspapers 
under the Cohen facts would infringe their First Amendment 
freedom and have a chilling effect. The state supreme court's 
1990 opinion stated that "[t]he potentiality for civil damages for 
promises made in this context chills public debate .... "lll That 
court went on to say that under different circumstances damages 
might be allowable under a promissory estoppel theory, but the 
110. In Broken Promises, Monica Langley, a Wall Street Journal reporter and ad-
junct professor at Georgetown Law School and Lee Levine, an attorney practicing media 
law in Washington, D.C., described a Wall Street Journal ("WSJ") memo from managing 
editor Norman Pearlstine. Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Broken Promises, 1988 COLUM. 
JOURNALISM REV. 21, 23 (1988). The memo differentiated between "anonymous" sources 
(WSJ agrees not to publish the source's name but reserves the right to disclose the 
source's name if necessary, such as in a libel suit, to show that WSJ had good reason for 
printing the source's information) and "confidential" sources (WSJ promises not to pub-
lish the source's name and promises to keep his identity secret, even if that means losing 
a lawsuit or going to jail). According to Langley and Levine, NBC had prepared a similar 
memorandum, and Harry Johnston of Time, Inc. considered the distinction sensible. [d. 
However, none of the interviewees in our survey used this language to make such a 
distinction. 
111. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 205. 
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court was concerned that this case dealt with information in a 
political campaign. "Of critical significance in this case, we 
think, is the fact that the promise of confidentiality arises in the 
classic First Amendment context of the quintessential public de-
bate in our democratic society, namely, a political source in-
volved in a political campaign."112 The fact that this case dealt 
with a political campaign was also considered key by Justices 
Blackmun and Souter in their dissenting opinions.1l3 
However, Justice White writing for the majority found the 
controlling line of decisions to be those "holding that generally 
applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply be-
cause their enforcement against the press has incidental effects 
on its ability to gather and report the news."lH Thus the United 
States Supreme Court majority thought that awarding damages 
to Cohen would have only an "incidental" effect on newspapers' 
ability to report the news. 
112. [d. at 205. 
113. Justice Blackmun's dissent (joined by Marshall and Souter) said: 
I do not read the decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota 
to create any exception to or immunity from the laws of that 
State for members of the press. In my view, the court's deci-
sion is premised, not on the identity of the speaker, but on the 
speech itself. Thus, the [Minnesota Supreme] court found it to 
be of 'critical significance,' that 'the promise of anonymity 
arises in the classic First Amendment context of the quintes-
sential public debate in our democratic society, namely, a po-
litical source involved in a political campaign.' Cohen, 457 
N.W.2d 199, 205 (1990). 
Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2520. 
Justice Souter's dissent (joined by Marshall, Blackmun and O'Connor) said: 
The importance of [the] public interest is integral to the 'bal-
ance that should be struck in this case. There can be no doubt 
that the fact of Cohen's identity expanded the universe of in-
formation relevant to the choice faced by Minnesota voters in 
that State's 1982 gubernatorial election, the publication of 
which was thus of the sort quintessentially subject to strict 
First Amendment protection. (Citations omitted.) The propri-
ety of his leak to respondents could be taken to reflect on his 
character, which in turn could be taken to reflect on the char-
acter of the candidate who had retained him as an adviser. An 
election could turn on just such a factor; if it should, I am 
ready to assume that it would be to the greater public good, at 
least over the long run. 
Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2523. 
114. Cohen, 111 S.Ct. at 2518. 
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The United States Supreme Court majority's view is largely 
confirmed by the survey (Table XXI). Only about eighteen per-
cent of interviewees expressed the view that the courts' ultimate 
decision to award damages to Cohen would have a chilling effect 
on newsgathering, resulting in fewer stories. Almost twenty per-
cent said the effect would be minimal. Many interviewees 
thought the major effect would be that newspaper managers 
would change their supervision practices, an incidental effect. A 
total of about seventy percent of the interviewees thought the 
courts' ultimate decision in Cohen was not a serious infringe-
ment (35.3%) or was a somewhat serious infringement (35.3%) 
on newspapers' First Amendment freedom, while only four in-
terviewees (7.8%) thought the decision was a very serious in-
fringement (Table XXIII).ll5 
Justices Blackmun and Souter were sensitive to the fact 
that the source of the Marlene Johnson information was rele-
vant to a voter weighing the impact of the last minute revela-
tions, and sensitive to the dilemma faced by the Star Tribune 
and Pioneer Press editors who chose to report Cohen's name. 
The Gelfand and Finnegan columns116 appear to be an honest 
explanation of the editors' decision-making processes. The col-
umns show that the editors made a rare exception to a policy of 
honoring reporters' promises of confidentiality because the edi-
tors thought the electorate had a right to know the source's 
identity. The fact that these two columns appeared eleven days 
after the original publication of the Cohen/Johnson story is evi-
dence of the editors' good faith. The columns show that the edi-
tors believed from the start that Cohen's name was newsworthy 
and that the editors did not raise this argument for the first 
time in court. 
In the Minnesota Supreme Court's 1990 Cohen decision, 
Justice Simonett noted that breaking a reporter's promise of 
confidentiality was extremely rare.ll7 Although no question on 
115. In Broken Promises, Langley and Levine weighed arguments for and against 
imposing liability for breaking promises of confidentiality. They said that imposing lia-
bility would encourage the consistent honoring of promises of confidentiality, while not 
imposing liability would protect the constitutional principle of removing from govern-
ment the power to regulate news. Langley and Levine contended that the argument 
against liability was stronger. Langley & Levine, supra note 110, at 24. 
116. See supra Appendix B, Exhibits 5 and 7. 
117. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 201. Langley and Levine, supra note 110 at 21-22, had 
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the survey asked interviewees whether they knew of any such 
incidents, no interviewees mentioned that they did and several 
interviewees commented that such breaches were rare. It was 
"astonishing that the [Star Tribune and Pioneer Press] did it," 
one interviewee remarked. Had the view of the Minnesota Su-
preme Court majority in the 1990 Cohen decision and Justices 
Blackmun and Souter prevailed, perhaps the interviewees' opin-
ions about the seriousness of the infringement would have been 
different. Greater emphasis might have been placed on the cir-
cumstances - a source close to the campaign of a gubernatorial 
candidate supplying negative information about an opposing 
candidate to the press in the eleventh hour - rather than 
predominantly on the fact that there was a breach of a promise 
of confidentiality which is almost universally viewed as 
dishonorable. 
C. HAS COHEN HAD AN EFFECT ON NEWSPAPER POLICIES? 
Thirty-two respondents (about sixty-three percent) had a 
policy for reporters about making promises of confidentiality 
(Table X). Only fourteen respondents (about twenty-eight per-
cent) had a policy for editors about overriding a reporter's prom-
ise of confidentiality (Table XIV). Of the thirty-two respondents 
that had a policy for reporters, seventeen (about fifty-three per-
cent) had reviewed it within the past five years (Table XIII). Of 
the fourteen respondents that had a policy for editors, six (about 
forty-three percent) had reviewed it within the past five years 
(Table XVII). 
Eleven interviewees answered a question about whether the 
Cohen case had prompted such review(s) at their newspaper 
(Table XVIII). A majority of those answering this question an-
swered affirmatively. Only one respondent had changed a re-
porter policy or editor policy because of the Cohen case. l1S The 
predicted more frequent breaches. They cited the following reasons why newspapers had 
revealed confidential sources: 1) to set the record straight; 2) to avoid paying large dam-
ages in libel actions; 3) where a person giving information about a crime turns out to be 
involved in the crime; and 4) where the source gives bad information. [d. 
Perhaps fewer promises are being made because of policy changes, but for whatever 
reason, testimony in the Cohen case, paralleled by data from this survey, seems to indi-
cate that breaking promises of confidentiality is still perceived to be rare. 
118. There are many possible reasons for this phenomenon. Only one respondent 
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fact that almost two-thirds of interviewees were not aware of the 
Cohen case (Table XX) means that the full potential effect of 
Cohen is not yet realized. us 
D. COHEN FROM A LABOR-MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 
Two interviewees took a labor-management perspective. If 
this perspective were adopted, a "scale of reporter power" could 
be constructed where one represents the reporter having no au-
tonomy regarding confidentiality and ten represents the reporter 
having complete autonomy. On this scale, the policies of over 
half of the respondents with policies would be closer to one than 
ten (fifty percent of respondents require editor approval, about 
six percent require publisher approval, and about six percent do 
not authorize reporters to promise confidentiality)(Table XII). 
Only eight respondents (twenty-five percent) authorize a re-
porter to promise confidentiality on his or her own. Of those 
newspaper had an editor policy giving editors the final say. Therefore, all other newspa-
pers would not feel threatened by the Cohen decision, and would not feel a need to 
change their policy. However, while this explains why newspapers would not change their 
editor policy, it does not fully explain why newspapers would not change their reporter 
policy. The interviewer noted that when asked to predict a likely result of the Cohen 
case, eight interviewees predicted that other newspapers would adopt their newspaper's 
policy. This could mean these interviewees believed that their publication already had 
the soundest, safest, and best policy. And in fact only 25% of respondents give reporters 
authority to make promises of confidentiality. See also infra note 121. 
119. We were somewhat surprised by how few respondents were aware of the Cohen 
case. However, the author of a 1978 survey regarding the effects of products liability law 
on California manufacturers found that "even though a manufacturer has a vested inter-
est in learning of a particular legal doctrine, there can be a substantial time lag before 
the manufacturer becomes aware of the policy." Patrick S. McInturff, Jr., Products Lia-
bility: The Impact on California Manufacturers, 19 AM. Bus. L. J. 343, 353 (1981). McIn-
turff surveyed California manufacturers of farm implements and out-of-state companies 
that held themselves out as doing a substantial farm implement business in California. 
He used the California Supreme Court's decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 
Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) as the referent for determining how long it had taken for 
manufacturers to become aware of products liability law (though he recognized that the 
judicial policy of products liability had preceded the Greenman decision by many years). 
McInturff asked the manufacturers when they first became aware of products liability 
law. He found that 44% of small firms and 56% of large firms first became aware of 
products liability law between 1970 and 1978. Thus, there was a time lag of between 
seven and fifteen years before these firms became aware of products liability law (using 
Greenman as the time referent). He also found that at the time of his survey (1978, 
fifteen years after Greenman), 18% of small firms and 11 % of large firms still did not 
know about products liability law. McInturff at 352. In light of McInturff's survey re-
sults, our survey results regarding the newspaper editors' lack of knowledge about the 
Cohen case are less surprising. 
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eight, most encouraged reporters to consult with their editor. 
Eleven interviewees (about twenty-two percent) predicted that 
the Cohen case would probably cause more newspapers to re-
quire editor approval (thus reducing reporters' autonomy)(Table 
XXI). 
Any manager's dilemma is to encourage employee creativity 
and growth, while knowing that the enterprise often bears re-
sponsibility for employee actions. To newspaper management, 
the dilemma involves giving a reporter authority to gather news 
and write articles, while knowing that the newspaper bears re-
sponsibility for the news it prints and is bound by its reporters' 
authorized promises to third parties. If existing policies about 
promises of confidentiality are an indication, and if the trend 
predicted by the interviewees materializes, then encouraging cre-
ativity and growth will lose ground to more protective policies 
about confidentiality. 
Two interviewees predicted that the Cohen case would 
probably have a negative effect on reporter morale (Table XXI). 
One interviewee even suggested that reporters should start a 
movement to unionize as a response to the decision. Telling a 
reporter that he is not trusted to decide whether to promise con-
fidentiality may certainly be demoralizing. However, situations 
involving promises of confidentiality are relatively rare and have 
consequences for the source, the reporter and the newspaper. 
Most reporters know that every word they write is subject to 
being edited. So the adoption of a policy requiring an editor's 
approval for promises of confidentiality might not be perceived 
as arbitrary or unjust. 
One respondent's policy is that the reporter is not to dis-
close the source's name even to the editor. At first glance this 
may seem to be the most empowering of policies for reporters. 
However, it might also be seen as a shirking of responsibility by 
management. The rationale is that the fewer people who know 
the source's identity, the more protected the information - but 
shouldn't an editor trust him or herself with the knowledge of 
the source's identity? Further, it is the editor's responsibility to 
decide whether a story should be run. Certainly the identity of a 
source is relevant, even necessary, to properly making this 
decision. 
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One respondent, a major newspaper, gives its reporters au-
thority to make promises of confidentiality but encourages them 
to consult with their editor. The interviewee commented that 
this newspaper only hired seasoned reporters, and implied that 
it would be demoralizing for these reporters to be told they 
could not make promises of confidentiality. This team concept is 
a very mature position. 
Perhaps the authority to make promises of confidentiality 
could be an earned privilege. Under such a policy, some report-
ers would be authorized to promise confidentiality while others 
would not. No respondent had such a policy. Perhaps none have 
considered it. Naturally such a policy could cause conflict be-
tween reporters who are authorized to promise confidentiality 
and those who are not. 
E. OBSERVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NEWSPAPER POLICIES 
The interviewees' views mirrored the complexity of the 
views of the judges who wrote the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in the Cohen case. Some interviewees thought the case 
would have little impact but that it was a serious intrusion on 
First Amendment freedom. Other interviewees thought the case 
would have negative effects but that it was not a serious intru-
sion. 120 Yet others felt the decision would have positive effects. 
While a few interviewees expressed sympathy for the Star Trib-
une's and Pioneer Press' decision to print Cohen's name, many 
more expressed the view that a reporter's promise of confidenti-
ality should be honored. Yet even among these interviewees, 
some believed the court's imposition of damages was a serious 
hindrance on newsgathering while others did not. 
Respondents' confidentiality policies were quite diverse as 
well. Only two respondents had a written policy for reporters, 
and none had a written policy for editors. Most policies dealt 
only with who has authority to make a promise of confidential-
ity. Some policies were simple: reporters are authorized to make 
promises of confidentiality, or reporters are not so authorized. 
120. These views may seem inconsistent. They may. on the other hand. not be mu-
tually exclusive but rather reflect sophisticated beliefs about the philosophical impor-
tance of the First Amendment as opposed to the real· life effects of the Cohen decision. 
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Some policies were complex, some open-ended, some specific: 
one policy required approval of an executive editor for condi-
tional promises (promises of confidentiality to the point of liti-
gation) and approval of the publisher for an absolute promise. 
While seventeen interviewees (one-third) had heard about the 
Cohen case, only seven respondents had reviewed their policies 
regarding their reporters' authority to make promises of confi-
dentiality as a result of this knowledge. While one respondent 
changed its policy because it had personally been involved in lit-
igation, only one significantly changed its policy because of the 
Cohen case.121 Some may have already changed their policies 
about who in the organization is authorized to make a promise 
of confidentiality because of earlier cases involving confidential-
ity,122 including the 1980-81 Janet Cooke incident at the Wash-
ington Post.123 So, while about thirty-one percent of interviewees 
predicted a likely effect of the Cohen case would be that news-
papers would take authority away from reporters (Table XX!), 
the Cohen case seems to have had little effect in this area at this 
time. 
121. One newspaper adopted a confidentiality policy requiring reporters to get an 
editor's approval. The decision to adopt a reporter policy was prompted by a change in 
structure resulting from growth in the department, but the decision to adopt a reporter 
policy requiring an editor's approval was prompted by the Cohen case. This newspaper 
is not counted as having substantially changed its policy, because it is possible that had 
the newspaper adopted a policy at an earlier time, it may have adopted the policy requir-
ing an editor's approval. A second newspaper modified its policy; the original policy re-
quired an editor's approval, and the modified policy requires a written approval. This 
newspaper is not counted as a change because of the Cohen case, since the Cohen deci-
sions did not discuss written approval. 
122. In a criminal case, a reporter may have to choose between disclosing a confi-
dential source or going to jail for contempt of court. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 
665 (1972). In a libel case, a reporter may have to choose between disclosing a confiden-
tial source and rendering his newspaper liable for a large damage award. See also supra 
note 117 and accompanying text. 
123. On Sept. 28, 1980, the Washington Post printed a story by Post reporter Janet 
Cooke about an eight-year-old heroin addict named "Jimmy." Cooke had fabricated the 
story. Cooke's story won her a Pulitzer prize, which the prize committee withdrew after 
Cooke acknowledged the fabrication to Post editors in April 1981. See Patrick E. Tyler 
& Lewis M. Simons, "Jimmy" Episode Evokes Outrage, Sadness; Media Wondering 
How Reporter's Fabrication Could Get Past Editors, WASH. POST, April 17, 1981, at A3. 
Langley and Levine, supra note 110 at 22, commented that Cooke "was nearly able to 
substitute fiction for news reporting precisely because she was not required to disclose 
her sources to her editors." Langley and Levine also noted that "[tlhe American Society 
of Newspaper Editors found that, a.fter the Janet Cooke episode, it became a general rule 
for a reporter to share with an editor the identity of a confidential source." Langley & 
Levine, supra note 78 at 22. 
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Few policies dealt with what promise(s) could or should be 
made. Few policies were specific or differentiated between the 
possible meanings of a promise of confidentiality. This lack of 
specificity naturally leaves the door open for subsequent dis-
putes over what was meant, but is perhaps understandable in 
the context of a reporter trying to get a story. In the Minnesota 
Supreme Court's 1990 Cohen decision, Justice Simonett charac-
terized a transaction between a reporter and a source who seeks 
confidentiality not as a contract negotiation, but as an "I'll 
scratch-your-back-if-you'll-scratch-mine" situation,124 where so-
phisticated negotiating would feel out of place. The one respon-
dent that turns the process into a negotiation and contract 
through its policyl2li requires approval of an executive editor and 
reviewed its policies because of various cases, including Cohen. 
It does not have in-house counsel but engages four law firms, 
one for corporate matters, one for personnel matters, one for li-
bel and one specializing in First Amendment issues. The inter-
viewee representing this respondent, who conjectured that a 
likely effect of the Cohen case would be larger legal bills, proba-
bly envisioned a trend toward an environment where transac-
tions between reporters and sources seeking confidentiality 
would become formal contractual negotiations. However, this in-
terviewee was alone in that prediction. Thus, Cohen and earlier 
cases caused only one of fifty-one respondents to formalize/"le-
gal-ize" the promise of confidentiality situation. Therefore, we 
believe that a formalization trend is not likely to develop at this 
time. 
Whatever the respondents' policies are about who makes 
the decision to promise confidentiality (a reporter alone, a re-
porter and editor together, or a publisher) or about what the 
promise(s) should be, the considerations concerning whether to 
promise confidentiality seemed universally to entail complex 
questions. These questions include how important the story is; 
whether the story could be developed through other sources; 
whether the source came to the newspaper as opposed to the 
newspaper going to the source; and the source's reasons for re-
questing confidentiality (was the source making charges to be 
spiteful? was he seeking to avoid losing his job, avoid public hu-
124. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 203. 
125. This was one of the two respondents that had written reporter poli~ies. 
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miliation, or avoid physical danger?). Many interviewees said 
they encourage reporters to do everything possible to avoid mak-
ing promises of confidentiality. While very few respondents had 
a policy of not printing any story based on a confidential source, 
several interviewees thought this policy was becoming more 
common and predicted this as a likely effect of the Cohen case 
(Table XXI). Some interviewees described this as a "chilling ef-
fect," while others saw it as a healthy trend. 
The primary factor that affected how frequently respon-
dents made promises of confidentiality was the respondent's 
coverage and audience. Respondents covering general news 
tended to treat each case on its own merits or had a general hos-
tility to making promises of confidentiality. But respondents 
with a special focus, such as business, had a higher rate of grant-
ing confidentiality. As the editor of one of these publications 
said, his newspaper did not deal with "public stuff;" he was con-
stantly "dealing with interested parties" and would not have any 
stories to print if he could not use confidential sources. 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The survey revealed that almost two-thirds of respondents 
have a policy for reporters about promises of confidentiality. Of 
the respondents with such policies, only twenty-five percent au-
thorize reporters to promise confidentiality without at least con-
sulting with and usually getting the permission of their editor. 
Just over a fourth of the respondents have a policy about 
editors overriding a reporter's promise of confidentiality. Only 
one respondent authorizes editors to override such a promise. 
The meaning of a promise of confidentiality varies across 
respondents and is relatively vague in about three-quarters of 
responses. The Cohen case does not seem to have caused news-
papers to move to more concrete bargaining regarding 
confidentiality. 
A third of the interviewees were aware of the Cohen case. Of 
the respondents who had policies for reporters concerning confi-
dentiality, about fifty-three percent had reviewed this policy 
within the past five years. Of the respondents who had policies 
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concerning an editor overriding a reporter's promise of confiden-
tiality, about forty-three percent had reviewed this policy within 
the past five years. Most such reviews were not prompted by the 
Cohen case. Only one respondent had substantively changed its 
confidentiality policies because of the Cohen case. The inter-
viewees predicted that newspapers would require greater super-
vision of reporters as a result of the Cohen case, though no such 
trend is clearly evident so far. A small but serious concern was 
expressed that reporters' morale could be adversely affected by a 
trend toward greater supervision. 
Few interviewees thought that if Cohen had lost, then confi-
dential sources would dry up. This was a fear that had been ex-
pressed by several judges in the various Cohen decisions. 
About thirty-five percent of interviewees thought that the 
Cohen case was not a serious infringement on editors' First 
Amendment freedom; the same percentage thought it was a 
somewhat serious infringement. About twenty-two percent 
thought it was a serious infringement, and about eight percent 
thought it was a very serious infringement. Thus, despite the po-
tential for a new source of liability, about seventy percent of in-
terviewees accepted the Cohen result as fair and not a particu-
larly serious infringement on editors' rights. 
The views of the interviewees matched the complexity of 
the views expressed by the judges in the various Cohen deci-
sions. Finally, the survey indicates that the courts' ultimate de-
cision to award damages to Dan Cohen has not yet had any sub-
stantial effect on newspaper policies regarding promises of 
confidentiality. 
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APPENDIX A - SURVEY RESULTS 
I - Job Title of Survey 
Participants 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent' Percent 
Editor 26 51.0 51.0 51.0 
Managing Editor 7 13.7 13.7 64.7 
Editor & Publisher 4 7.8 7.8 72.5 
Executive Editor 3 5.9 5.9 78.4 
City Editor 3 5.9 5.9 84.3 
News Editor 2 3.9 3.9 88.2 
Editor-in-Chief 1 2.0 2.0 90.2 
Other 5 9.8 9.8 100.0 
51 
II - Type of Publication 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Daily 17 33.3 33.3 33.3 
Weekly 31 60.8 60.8 94.1 
Other 3 5.9 5.9 100.0 
51 
III - Location at Publication 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
East 7 13.7 13.7 13.7 
South 12 23.5 23.5 37.2 
Midwest 21 41.2 41.2 78.4 
West 11 21.6 21.6 100.0 
51 
IV - Circulation of 
Publication 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
100 - 1,000 1 2.0 2.0 2.0 
1,001 - 10,000 23 45.1 45.1 47.1 
10,001 - 100,000 18 35.3 35.3 82.4 
100,001 - 500,000 7 13.7 13.7 96.1 
500,001 - 1,000,000 1 2.0 2.0 98.0 
>1,000,000 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
51 
1 Valid percent is the percent of those who gave an answer other than "no response" 
whereas percent is calculated including those who answered "no response." 
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V - Publications Using In-
house Counsel2 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
For all legal work 5 9.8 62.5 62.5 
For corporate work only 3 5.9 37.5 100.0 
8 
VI - Publications Using 
Counsel other than In-house 
Counsels 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Single outside firm 18 35.3 40.9 40.9 
Two outside firms 7 13.7 15.9 56.8 
More than two outside firms 3 5.9 6.8 63.6 
Hotline 6 11.8 13.6 77.3 
Hotline & local counsel 3 5.9 6.8 84.1 
Parent company attorney 3 5.9 6.8 90.9 
Parent company attorney & 4 7.8 9.1 100.0 
local counsel 
No response 7 3.7 
51 
VII - Percent of Sources 
Who Seek Confidentiality 
from Respondent Publication 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Less than 1 % 10 19.6 20.8 20.8 
Less than 5 % 21 41.2 43.8 64.6 
Less than 10% 9 17.6 18.8 83.3 
20% 4 7.8 8.3 91.7 
25-30% 4 7.8 8.3 100.0 
No response 3 5.9 
51 
• Not surprisingly, only some of the larger newspapers employ in-house counsel. Of 
those that did, however, over one·third use in· house counsel for corporate matters only 
and turn to specialty firms for libel, First Amendment, criminal and even commercial 
matters. 
• While many newspapers that don't employ in-house counsel refer all legal work to 
a single firm (41 % of those who responded), many (22.7% of those who responded) use 
specialty firms. Appreciation for the existence of hotlines was expressed by a number of 
respondents. And the degree of integration of the industry is reflected by the number of 
respondents (7, or 13.7% of the sample) who use a parent company's attorney for some 
or all of their legal work. 
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VIII - What a Promise of 
Confidentiality Means to 
Respondent Publication 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Won't divulge source to 25 49.0 54.3 54.3 
public 
Won't divulge source to 9 17.6 19.6 73.9 
anyone 
Won't divulge even in court 2 3.9 4.3 78.3 
Background (use description) 5 9.8 10.9 89.1 
Whatever is negotiated 5 9.8 10.9 100.0 
No response 5 9.8 
51 
IX - Publication's Response 
to Source's Request for 
Confidentiality 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Treat on case by case basis 21 41.2 43.7 43.7 
Request denied >90% of 14 27.5 29.2 72.9 
time 
Waive confidentiality or 4 7.8 8.3 81.2 
won't publish 
Request agreed to about 50% 2 3.9 4.2 85.4 
of time 
Other [Request agreed to 7 13.7 14.6 100.0 
25%,85%, & 95% of time; 
either agree or don't proceed; 
insist on at least background; 
depends on whether story 
was generated by respondent 
newspaper (then agree 100%) 
or by source (then agree 
0%)] 
No response 3 5.9 
51 
X - Publication Has a 
Promise of Confidentiality 
Policy for Reporters 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Yes 32 62.7 62.7 62.7 
No 19 37.3 37.3 100.0 
51 
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XI - Publication Has a 
Written Promise of 
Confidentiality Policy for 
Reporters 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Yes 2 3.9 6.7 6.7 
No 28 54.9 93.3 100.0 
No response 21 41.2 
51 
XII - Nature of 
Publication's Promise of 
Confidentiality Policy for 
Reporters 
Frequency . Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Editor approval required 16 50.0 50.0 50.0 
Publisher approval required 2 6.3 6.3 56.3 
Reporter authorized to make 8 25.0 25.0 81.3 
promise 
Reporter not authorized to 2 6.3 6.3 87.5 
make promise 
Other (Background; Prefer 4 12.5 12.5 100.0 
no confidential sources; Must 
be discussed with editor) 
32 
XIII - Publication's Promise 
of Confidentiality Policy for 
Reporters was Reviewed 
within Past Five Years 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Yes 17 53.1 56.7 56.7 
No 13 40.6 43.3 100.0 
No response 2 6.3 
32 
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XIV - Publication Has a 
Policy for Editors about 
Overriding a Reporter's 
Promise of Confidentiality 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Yes 14 27.5 28.0 28.0 
No 36 70.6 72.0 100.0 
No response 1 1.9 
51 
XV - Publication Has a 
Written Policy for Editors 
about Overriding a 
Reporter's Promise of 
Confidentiality 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Yes 0 0 0 0 
No 12 85.7 100.0 100.0 
No response 2 14.3 
14 
XVI - Nature of 
Publication's Policy for 
Editors about Overriding a 
Reporter's Promise of 
Confidentiality 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Honor reporter's promise 9 64.3 64.3 64.3 
Editors have authority to 1 7.1 7.1 71.4 
override but would either 
honor promise or not publish 
Honor promise or not use 3 21.4 21.4 92.8 
information in story 
Editor has final say 1 7.1 7.1 100.0 
14 
44
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss2/4
1994] COHEN v. COWLES MEDIA COMPANY 467 
XVII - Publication's Policy 
for Editors about Overriding 
a Reporter's Promise of 
Confidentiality was Reviewed 
within Past Five Years 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Yes 6 42.9 46.2 46.2 
No 7 50.0 53.8 100.0 
No response 1 0.1 
14 
XVIII - Review(s) were 
Prompted by Knowledge of 
Cohen Case 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Yes 6 31.6 54.5 54.5 
No 5 26.3 45.5 100.0 
No response 8 42.1 
19 
XIX - How Publication 
Became Aware of Cohen 
Case 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Professional journal(s) 3 17.6 42.9 42.9 
Professional journal(s) and 4 23.5 57.1 100.0 
contacted by attorney 
No response 10 58.8 
17 
XX - Interviewee Was 
Aware of Cohen Case 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Yes 17 33.3 34.0 34.0 
No 33 64.7 66.0 100.0 
No response 1 2.0 
51 
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XXI - Interviewee's Opinion 
about Likely Effect of Cohen 
Case on Newspaper Industry 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative . 
Percent Percent 
Change of policies to require 11 21.6 22.4 22.4 
editor's approval 
Increased supervision of 4 7.8 8.2 30.6 
reporters 
Chilling effect - fewer stories 9 17.6 18.4 49.0 
Negative effect on reporter 2 3.9 4.1 53.1 
morale 
Editors will honor promises 5 9.8 10.2 63.3 
of confidentiality 
Minimal effect 10 19.6 20.4 83.7 
Other (could lose basic 8 15.7 16.3 100.0 
freedom of speech; reporters 
won't even tell source's name 
to editor; increased stress; 
more lawyer bills) 
No response 2 3.9 
51 
XXII - Interviewee Thought 
If Cohen had Lost Then 
Anonymous Sources Would 
Likely Dry Up 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Yes 7 13.7 14.3 14.3 
No 37 72.5 75.5 89.8 
Possibly but not likely 5 9:8 10.2 100.0 
No response 2 3.9 
51 
XXIII - Interviewee 
Thought Effect of Cohen 
Case on Editors' First 
Amendment Freedom Was: 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Not serious 18 35.3 35.3 35.3 
Somewhat serious 18 35.3 35.3 70.6 
Serious 11 21.6 21.6 92.2 
Very serious 4 7.8 7.8 100.0 
51 
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APPENDIX B 
EXHIBIT 1 
Minneapolis Star and Tribune} 
Thursday, October 28, 1982 
Page 1A 
MARLENE JOHNSON ARRESTS DISCLOSED By WHITNEY ALLY 
By Staff Writer 
469 
Court records showing that DFL lieutenant governor candi-
date Marlene Johnson was convicted more than 12 years ago on 
a misdemeanor charge of shoplifting were given to· reporters 
Wednesday by Dan Cohen, a friend and political associate of IE. 
gubernatorial candidate Wheelock Whitney. 
The conviction, which Johnson said stemmed from her for-
getting to pay for $6 worth of sewing items, was later vacated. 
Cohen took copies of the court records to several news orga-
nizations, along with records showing that Johnson had been ar-
rested for unlawful assembly shortly before the shoplifting 
charge. That case was later dropped. 
Both Whitney and his campaign manager, Jann Olsten, said 
Cohen had acted without knowledge or permission of the candi-
date or his staff. Both said such information about a candidate's 
past ought to be available to the public before an election. 
Olsten acknowledged that he learned Tuesday about John-
son's conviction. Whitney, on a campaign tour in northern Min-
nesota, said last night from Moorhead that "the first time I 
heard about it was this afternoon on the bus." 
He added, "I don't recall talking to Dan Cohen in the last 
two months. I don't know how Cohen got the information about 
Johnson - he must have looked it up in the records." 
Johnson, 36, said former Gov. Rudy Perpich knew about the 
incident when he chose her as his running mate, and that "we 
both agreed it didn't have any bearing on my qualifications to-
1. Reprinted with permission of the Star Tribune, Minneapolis. 
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day to be lieutenant governor." 
DFLers, including Perpich, were quick to accuse Whitney's 
campaign of 11th hour muckraking. 
"This is an indication of the absolute desperation of the 
other side," said Perpich campaign manager Eldon Brustuen. 
"They're trying to find more to attack us on - their attacks so 
far haven't worked." 
Perpich said he is proud of his running mate and has "abso-
lute confidence" in her. "In the last 12 years, she's been in busi-
ness, a taxpayer, a good citizen, a very meaningful contributor to 
society . . . I just feel Minnesotans judge people on those 
things," he said. 
He said he didn't know whether the revelations will harm 
the Perpich-Johnson campaign. Of its potential impact on this 
campaign, Whitney said, "I don't care if it could or couldn't 
backfire on my campaign ... but I certainly think it's legiti-
mate information." Johnson's first arrest occurred in September 
1969, when she and a half-dozen other Urban League protesters 
were arrested at a sewer construction site on Dayton Av. in St. 
Paul for refusing to leave a construction ditch. They were pro-
testing the city's alleged failure to hire minority workers on con-
struction projects. 
The three counts of unlawful assembly against Johnson 
were dismissed on April 27, 1970, the day her father, Buford 
Johnson of Braham, Minn., died. 
The death of her father, whom she refers to in campaign 
speeches as a major influence in her life, left her "very upset," 
she said yesterday. 
"I wasn't myself for quite a while. Within a month, I lost 20 
pounds, I got my first-ever speeding ticket, and when I forgot to 
pay for $6 worth of buttons and sewing materials at the Sears 
store on Rice St., I was arrested." 
The records indicate that she was arrested on May 25 and 
convicted on June 3, 1970. Sentencing was deferred until Feb. 6, 
1971, when the conviction was vacated - a common practice in 
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cases involving first offenders. 
"The judge concluded that the situation did not reflect my 
past or what was expected to be my future," Johnson said. Be-
cause the conviction was vacated, she has no criminal record, she 
said. 
Johnson heads the St. Paul advertising agency Split Infini-
tive, Inc., which she founded in 1970. Her campaign for lieuten-
ant governor is her first bid for eleCtive office. 
Johnson has been a leader in small business and women's 
organizations in recent years heading the National Association 
of Women Business Owners, the DFL Small Business Task 
Force, the Minnesota delegation to the 1980 White House Con-
ference on Small Business and the Minnesota Women's Political 
Caucus. In 1980, she won the St. Paul Jaycees' Distinguished 
Service Award for Community Service. 
Cohen said the issue he hoped to raise by releasing the 
records "isn't whether Ms. Johnson has been convicted, but 
whether she tried to conceal it from the public." 
Cohen, a former Independent-Republican alderman in Min-
neapolis who this year ran unsuccessfully for the Hennepin 
County Board, noted that when he was arrested for scalping a 
ticket at the Kentucky Derby three years ago, he publicized the 
incident immediately. 
Cohen is an advertising executive with Martin-Williams Inc. 
and assisted Whitney with production of some TV ads. He is not 
on the campaign payroll and does not sit on its steering commit-
tee. He and Whitney have been friends since 1957, when Cohen's 
father, the late Merrill Cohen, hired Whitney at J. M. Dain Co., 
now Dain Bosworth, Inc., the investment firm Whitney headed 
during the 1960s. 
"The voters of this state are entitled to know that kind of 
information. Every day Perpich and Johnson failed to reveal it 
to them, they were living a lie," he said. 
A check-out log of court records in the St. Paul Municipal 
Court archives indicates that files on the Johnson cases have 
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been checked out only once in 1982 - on Tuesday, by Gary 
Flakne, former Hennepin County attorney and a former IR 
legislator. 
Flakne said yesterday, he heard "quite a while ago ... 
through the grapevine" that Johnson had a criminal record. He 
said he could not say who gave him the information or why he 
waited until this week to obtain copies of the documents. 
A clerk in the archives, Robert Granger, said he remembers 
one previous inquiry about Johnson's records several months 
ago. It may have been a telephone inquiry, Granger said, be-
cause it does not appear on the log. 
Olsten said he first became aware of Johnson's conviction 
Tuesday, after Whitney's running mate, Lauris Krenik, was in-
terviewed by Dick Pomerantz, host of a talk show on KSTP-AM 
radio. 
Pomerantz said yesterday that he has known for several 
months about the shoplifting case. He said he asked Krenik, 
"Suppose there was something in somebody's background 12 or 
15 years ago, a petty-theft .... Should that person be judged 
on that?" 
He denied mentioning Johnson's name to Krenik. Olsten, 
however, said that Krenik left the broadcast with the under-
standing that Johnson had been convicted of petty theft. 
Whitney said that when he heard of the matter yesterday, 
"I said, 'Where in the hell did that come from?' I understood it 
came from Dick Pomerantz." 
Olsten said that as of yesterday afternoon, the Whitney 
campaign had no plans to mention Johnson's record in speeches 
or advertisements in the final week of the campaign. 
"Certainly, a person's character and integrity are things 
people ought to look at when they vote for the second highest 
office in the state," Olsten said. "I wouldn't presume to tell vot-
ers whether I think this is relevant to the campaign - I'd leave 
that up to them." 
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Whitney said, "I honestly think it's a legitimate piece of in-
formation and if it happened to my running mate, well, then 
people ought to know. Your past is part of your history. An ac-
cumulation of facts. It's absolutely legitimate to talk about." 
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EXHIBIT 2 
St. Paul Pioneer Press l 
Thursday, October 28, 1982 
Page D1 
PERPICH RUNNING MATE ARRESTED IN PETTY THEFT CASE IN '70 
By Bill Salisbury, 
Staff' Writer 
Marlene Johnson, the DFL candidate for lieutenant gover-
nor, was convicted 12 years ago of shoplifting $6 worth of sewing 
supplies. 
Court records concerning the conviction - which has been 
expunged from her record - were given to reporters Wednesday 
by a prominent Independent-Republican. 
Johnson confirmed the report and said it is "irrelevant" to 
the campaign. She said she told former Gov. Rudy Perpich 
about the incident before he selected her as his running mate. 
"It's a last-minute smear campaign," Johnson said, charging 
that I-R gubernatorial candidate Wheelock Whitney was behind 
the revelation. 
"Wheelock knew nothing about it," Whitney campaign 
manager Jann Olsten said. "It's a predictable response. If I were 
in her position, I'd try to shift the attention on someone else, 
too." 
Perpich gave Johnson an "absolute" vote of confidence. 
"She told me about it; she told me about the circumstances, and 
I just judged her on what I believe she can do as lieutenant gov-
ernor," he said in a telephone interview from Winona. 
Asked what political damage the revelation might have, 
Perpich replied, "I don't know, I just feel that Minnesotans 
judge people by what they do in society, and I believe that she 
has been a very meaningful contributor to society." 
1. Reprinted with permission of the St. Paul Pioneer Press. 
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Johnson said the incident occurred at a time when she was 
distraught over the recent death of her father. 
She said that on May 25, 1970, she walked out of the Sears 
store, 425 Rice St., with "$6 worth of buttons and other sewing 
materials" without paying for it. She was arrested. 
"I was very close to my father and was upset by his death," 
she said. "I was under stress - I had lost about 20 pounds -
and I also got my first speeding ticket at about the same time." 
Court records show Johnson was found guilty of petty theft 
on June 3, 1970, but that the conviction was vacated Feb. 6, 
1971, without a sentence being imposed. Johnson said this 
means that "I do not have a criminal record." 
She also confirmed a court record that she was arrested in 
1969 for "unlawful assembly" for participating in a civil rights 
protest demonstration. The charge was dropped before the case 
went to trial. 
Dan Cohen, a Minneapolis advertising and public relations 
consultant, gave the court records to at least three reporters, but 
asked that his name not be used. Cohen, a former I-R alderman 
who has run unsuccessfully for mayor and county commissioner, 
said he was delivering the records for another person, whom he 
declined to identify. "The issue isn't whether Miss Johnson has 
been convicted of a misdemeanor, but whether she concealed it," 
Cohen said. 
" ... every day that Miss Johnson failed to reveal her con-
viction and Mr. Perpich knew about it, they were living a lie." 
Cohen is not involved in the Whitney campaign at present, but 
was employed by Whitney as an advertising consultant for a 
time early this year, according to Olsten. He insisted Whitney 
knew nothing of Cohen's plan to release the court records. 
"We were not behind bringing this to light," Olsten said. 
"But regardless of how it became public, it goes to the honesty 
and moral character of the person involved." 
Johnson said she was informed that the records were 
slipped to reporters by "someone close to the Whitney cam-
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paign." She declined to identify her source. 
Johnson, the first woman chosen by a major party as its 
lieutenant governor candidate in Minnesota, owns Split Infini-
tive, a St. Paul advertising and public relations firm. 
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EXHIBIT 3 
Minneapolis Star and Tribune! 




Not long after rummaging in the rug pile of politics to make 
his revelations of Marlene Johnson's past, Dan Cohen struck a 
pose of shining morality. 
It is not an easy role switch to bring off, standing there slip-
ping a pair of white gloves over soiled fingernails. 
Nonetheless Dan Cohen comes to us in those most improba-
ble robes of all for the potential partisan and publicist: The 
Conscience of the Community. 
Rudy Perpich and Marlene Johnson have been living a lie 
for months for not disclosing her arrest on a charge of shoplift-
ing 12 years ago. 
How do we know this constitutes living a lie? 
The conscience has so defined it. 
We have been spared the fool's innocence and gullibility. 
Knowing all the dirt there is to know about Marlene Johnson, 
we can go to the ballot boxes as an informed electorate, satisfied 
that every dark or suspicious cranny bearing on the character of 
every candidate on the ballot has been revealed to us. 
Do you believe it has? 
If you do, there is still a chance for Santa Claus and Little 
Red Riding Hood. 
This is the sham of a partisan personality or personalities 
taking what everybody can understand as a piece of campaign 
hardball, sleazy as it is, and trying to elevate it as a public 
1. Reprinted with permission of the Star Tribune, Minneapolis. 
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serVIce. 
The record says Marlene Johnson, now the Democratic-
Farmer-Labor candidate for lieutenant governor, was arrested at 
the age of 24 on a charge of taking $6 worth of sewing goods 
from a store. The charge was later vacated. She says she was 
emotionally overwrought because of a death in the family at the 
time, and forgot to pay. The record also shows she was arrested 
a year earlier when she and other protesters refused to leave a 
construction site where the city of St. Paul allegedly had failed 
to hire minority workers. 
The ethics of this kind of under-the-Iog-grubbing the week 
before the election can be argued. Cohen - and Wheelock 
Whitney - may be right in calling Marlene Johnson's two mis-
demeanor arrests legitimate information helpful to the voters in 
measuring her and making a judgment. 
Dan Cohen then makes a higher judgment and a 
characterization. 
Johnson and Whitney's opponent, Rudy Perpich, are liars-
by-suppression. 
They are more than liars. They have been living a lie every 
day by not revealing it. Didn't Dan Cohen come clean with the 
world, he asks, when he got arrested for scalping tickets at the 
Kentucky Derby? 
He did, although the world might have muddled through 
without the information. Because Dan was arrested for scalping, 
he feels fully qualified to enter the campaign as the judge of 
Marlene Johnson's honesty. 
But let's take this as a criterion for honesty - as enunci-
ated by the hardball-playing publicist trying to get his candidate 
elected. 
Every candidate who withholds any information from the 
voters that might bear on his or her character or integrity, pro-
fessionally or personally, is living a lie. 
This means that all candidates on the ballot must come for-
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ward today with every marital indiscretion or act of adultery, 
every instance when they dragged on joint of pot or worse at a 
private party, or got blasted out of their skulls on booze and 
howled racial epithets and profanities. These and others. We will 
demand this kind of honesty from each candidate on each ticket 
from top to bottom, DFLers, IRs and the rest. And when they 
all have come forward with their revelations, then we can damn 
Marlene Johnson for not making hers. 
My guess is that alongside other cases of human fallibility 
on the ballot, Marlene Johnson's is mild. 
The irony here is that for the second time in four years, 
something about morality has arisen late in a campaign waged 
against Perpich. It is the shabbiest kind of a late-thrown kidney 
punch. However his performance is measured, his personal and 
professional ethics are recognized by all who know him, even re-
motely. Four years ago some zealous campaigners papered 
church parking lots with material suggesting that a vote for his 
opponent was a vote for God. 
He is now supposed to be a liar by concealment. The mid-
week tempest may be nothing more than a footnote to the elec-
tion. Either way the chronology by which it reached the public 
tells us more about the quality of the politics of those who in-
spired it than it does about the politics of Marlene Johnson and 
Perpich. 
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EXHIBIT 4 
Minneapolis Star and Tribune l 
Sunday, November 7, 1982 
Page 18A 
LETTERS FROM READERS 
NEWSPAPER ETHICS 
Before the Nov. 2 election, your newspaper published an ar-
ticle concerning the shoplifting conviction of Marlene Johnson, 
DFL candidate for lieutenant governor. The manner in which 
this story was handled demonstrated a complete lack of 
integrity. 
Dan Cohen, a former public official and former contributor 
to your newspaper, made available to your reporter documented 
court records of Johnson's arrest and conviction. That informa-
tion had not previously been brought to the public's attention. 
Cohen felt that facts relevant to a candidate's past or present 
fitness should be divulged and discussed before the election. 
Cohen brought these documents to your newspaper on the 
absolute and clearly stated condition that he remain anonymous. 
He trusted the traditional integrity of a reporter and a newspa-
per to protect sources of information at all cost, even if 
threatened with punishment. Cohen's trust was misplaced, a 
costly mistake for him. 
Cohen was assured that his name would not be used. Subse-
quently, your newspaper published a story revealing him as the 
source. Cohen was fired from his job and has been subjected to 
public embarrassment and ridicule because his name appeared 
in that story. For what reason? Surely your paper did not need 
to breach its agreement with Cohen to confirm the truth of the 
information. A minimal amount of investigation by one of your 
1. Reprinted with permission of the Star Tribune, Minneapolis. 
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reporters would have revealed that the information was correct 
without revealing a confidential source. You have given all per-
sons fair warning that Star and Tribune assurances of source 
confidentiality cannot compete with expediency. 
Gary Flakne, Bloomington. 
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EXHIBIT 5 
Minneapolis Star and Tribune1 
Sunday, November 7, 1982 
Page 18A 
IF You RAN THE NEWSPAPER. 
By Lou Gelfand 
Readers' representative 
On Oct. 27, six days before last Tuesday's election, Indepen-
dent-Republican activist Dan Cohen offered Star and Tribune 
political reporter Lori Sturdevant, and at least three other re-
porters, what he described as an important news tip. 
He had a caveat: He insisted on confidentiality before he 
would reveal his information. 
Sturdevant accepted the information on that basis. So did 
Bill Salisbury of the St. Paul Pioneer Press, Gerry Nelson of the 
Associated Press and Dave Nimmer of WCCO-TV. They appar-
ently were the only ones Cohen contacted. I wanted to confirm 
this and other details with Cohen, but he did not return my 
phone calls. 
At the daily conference of Star and Tribune editors 
Wednesday afternoon, Robert Franklin, city editor, summarized 
Cohen's tip. Marlene Johnson, DFL lieutenant governor candi-
date, had been arrested and convicted in 1970 for shoplifting. 
Eight months later the charge was vacated, i.e., the conviction 
was no longer on her record. 
Franklin said he had confirmed the accuracy of the tip. 
The editors argued whether Cohen's name should be used, 
with or without his approval. The decision was delayed pending 
receipt of more information on the Cohen-Sturdevant conversa-
tion, and on how widely Cohen's activity was known. 
Ultimately, the decision to report Cohen's involvement was 
made by Mike Finney, an assistant managing editor, and re-
1. Reprinted with permission of the Star Tribune, Minneapolis. 
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viewed by Frank Wright, managing editor for news. Sturdevant 
called Cohen about 7:30 p.m. to advise that the agreement would 
not be honored. Cohen said that if he was to be identified he 
wanted to be quoted as saying: "The voters of this state are enti-
tled to know that kind of information. Every day Perpich and 
Johnson failed to reveal it to them, they were living a lie." He 
was so quoted. 
Sturdevant was not pleased with the decision to use Cohen's 
name. She wrote the article for the Oct. 21 issue, but requested 
that her by-line not appear. Instead, the article was "By Staff 
Writer." Finney said he "had two main reasons" for identifying 
Cohen. "The first was that the source of the information was no 
longer a secret. Although Cohen had asked us for anonymity, 
many people knew he had given the material to the local media. 
In addition, the circumstances of how we received the informa-
tion were important to our readers so they could put the John-
son record into perspective." 
Wright responded to two questions: 1. Should we have pub-
lished the article? "Yes, for two reasons. First, while the sub-
stance was relatively minor and we wouldn't have turned it up 
on our own, it was marginally worth reporting. Second, the man-
ner in which Whitney supporters made it public at the last min-
ute in the campaign warranted full disclosure of their methods." 
Question 2: Was it ethical to use Cohen's name? Wright 
said, "Under the circumstances I feel it was ethical. While a re-
porter originally agreed to confidentiality (which should not 
have happened without consultation with an editor), that agree-
ment quickly became ludicrous. Cohen was going all over town 
peddling the information to every media outlet he could find. He 
was doing it openly. We and others saw him. The knowledge 
that he was the source was very widespread. Expecting confiden-
tiality while so brazenly distributing the material was 
ridiculous. " 
The St. Paul Pioneer Press also identified Cohen under sim-
ilar circumstances. Reporter Salisbury omitted Cohen's name 
but told his supervisors the source. Executive Editor David Hall 
decided Cohen's name be used. 
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Said Hall: "Our news room policy says pretty clearly that 
we discourage the use of anonymous sources. It says a reporter 
should check with his superior before promising confidentiality. 
I think when they bring up a charge like this late in the cam-
paign it is serious, and I think readers need as much information 
as possible about the process . . . not only the facts but how the 
story came to light." 
"We have a different situation where a person is going 
around and giving this information to a number of people. I was 
uncomfortable with the seriousness of the charge and I thought 
the readers had a right to know." 
Nelson, AP correspondent at the state capitol, advised his 
supervisor, Larry McDermott, of the agreement with Cohen. The 
AP story did not refer to Cohen. After 11 o'clock that evening, 
when the first edition of the Star and Tribune appeared with its 
story identifying Cohen, the AP dispatched a new story identify-
ing him. 
Three of the four Twin Cities commercial television stations 
used the first AP story on their 10 p.m. news. WCCO-TV wrote 
. its own, based on Cohen's contact with Nimmer. Nimmer gave 
the information to colleague Karen Boros without identifying 
the source, says Doug Stone, the station's assignment editor. 
Before the 10 p.m. newscast, Cohen, aware that the Star 
and Tribune would report his involvement, called WCCO-TV to 
advise Nimmer his name could be used, Stone says. But Nimmer 
had left for the night. 
The incident raises a number of issues that affect readers: 
1. If tipsters cannot rely on the word of a reporter, will they 
quit confiding and thus erode important sources of information? 
That issue is raised below in a letter to the editor from Gary 
Flakne, former Hennepin County attorney and a former IR leg-
islator. Flakne was identified in Sturdevant's article as the indi-
vidual who checked Johnson's court file the day before Cohen 
talked with newspapers. 
2. It is not uncommon for reporters to be told by an inter-
viewee: "Can I tell you something off the record?" Where does 
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the reporter draw the line when the decision must be forwarded 
to a supervisor? 
3. When you give the same information to more than one 
reporter, is it still confidential? 
Comment: Which comes first? The confidential information 
from the tipster or the promise to honor the confidence? Sturde-
vant accepted Cohen's offer, assuming her editors would agree. 
Right or wrong, what she did is not unusual for reporters. My 
second guessing her would be not fair. 
Editors Finney, Wright and Hall believe that if a confidence 
is shared by a number of people it no longer is a confidence. 
Cohen weakened his stand on confidentiality when, upon 
being advised by Sturdevant that his name would be used, he 
asked to be quoted that (Rudy) Perpich and Johnson were "liv-
ing a lie." While not ecstatic, he was, in effect, releasing Sturde-
vant from the agreement for confidentiality. Otherwise, he would 
have continued to hold his position. 
Sturdevant's article told in detail how and by whom the in-
formation was gained from court files. That was the news, more 
than the facts of Johnson's arrest and conviction. 
WCCO-TV editor Stone said the station did not plan to 
broadcast the story, but when the first Associated Press story 
protecting the tipster appeared in the afternoon, Stone knew the 
other stations would use it. 
In my view, for this newspaper to have published the infor-
mation without the source would have jeopardized its credibility 
with the reader. Publishing Cohen's name without his permis-
sion is justified by an unspoken standard of journalism that de-
fines the substance of Cohen's tip as beneath the threshold of 
acceptable, unattributable information. 
If the incident contributes to the cleansing of political 
campaigning, then it will have served a purpose. 
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EXHIBIT 6 
St. Paul Sunday Pioneer Press l 
November 7, 1982 
Page 2G 
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
A 'BREACH OF CONFIDENTIALITY' PROTESTED 
On Oct. 28, your newspaper published an article concerning 
the shoplifting conviction of lieutenant governor candidate Mar-
lene Johnson. The manner in which that story was handled 
demonstrated a complete lack of integrity. I am compelled to 
protest your breach of trust in revealing the identity of a confi-
dential source. 
Dan Cohen, a former public official and contributing editor 
to the Minneapolis Star, who understands well the integrity of a 
free press, made available to your reporter documented court 
records of Ms. Johnson's arrest history and conviction. 
That information had not previously been brought to the 
attention of the public, although it was easily available. Mr. Co-
hen felt that, especially in an election year, facts relevant to a 
candidate's past or present fitness should be divulged and dis-
cussed before people voted on the qualifications of that person 
for public office. It would make little or no sense to discuss it 
after the election. 
For reasons of his own which require no explanation or jus-
tification, and within hours of learning of this information, Mr. 
Cohen brought these documents to your reporter and your news-
paper with the absolute and clearly stated condition that he not 
be revealed as the source of this information and that he remain 
anonymous. 
He trusted and relied upon the traditional integrity of a re-
porter and a newspaper in similar circumstances: to protect 
sources of information at all cost, even if threatened with pun-
ishment. In this instance, that reliance and trust were misplaced 
1. Reprinted with permission of the St. Paul Pioneer Press. 
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and [this] was a costly mistake for him. 
Mr. Cohen informed your reporter that the information 
given was contingent upon confidentiality. He requested and was 
promised anonymity. Subsequent to that promise and assurance 
and after he delivered the information to your reporter, he was 
then informed by that same reporter that your paper had de-
cided to reveal him as the source and that the story was going to 
be printed with that information. 
Mr. Cohen refused to negotiate on the release of your pledge 
of anonymity and once again informed your reporter that he had 
not and would not give permission to have his name used to be 
revealed as the source of this information. At no time was Mr. 
Cohen given the opportunity to withdraw the information he 
had given to the reporter so as to protect his anonymity. 
Your paper then saw fit to violate the absolute anonymity 
which had been promised and proceeded to publish the article, 
revealing Mr. Cohen as the source of the information. 
Mr. Cohen was fired from his job because his name ap-
peared in that particular story and he has been subjected to 
public embarrassment and ridicule. For what reason? Surely, 
your paper did not need to breach its agreement with Mr. Cohen 
in order to confirm the veracity of the factual data which he 
gave to you. A minimal amount of investigation by any of your 
reporters would have revealed that the information was correct 
without breaking a confidentiality or revealing a source. 
The only rational conclusion is that, somehow, this story 
was such that it would justify the breaking of a promise and the 
breach of trust. By taking this action, you have compromised 
journalistic integrity. 
GARY W. FLAKNE 
Minneapolis 
Gary Flakne is a Minneapolis lawyer and former Hennepin 
County attorney. 
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EXHIBIT 7 
St. Paul Sunday Pioneer Press l 
Sunday, November 7, 1982 
Page 2G 
Editor's Notebook/John R. Finnegan 
Solving a Problem of Confidentiality 
Newsmen feel strongly about protecting the confidentiality 
of their news sources. 
And they should. 
But granting confidentiality is not always a good idea or in 
the public interest. 
Confidentiality became more than just a philosophical issue 
during the recent gubernatorial campaign. It became an immedi-
ate problem requiring immediate action. 
A reporter granted confidentiality to a news source. An edi-
tor took it away. 
It began when Bill Salisbury, one of- our state government 
reporters, received a telephone call from Dan Cohen, a Minneap-
olis advertising and public relations man. Cohen said he wanted 
to see Bill, that he had some information Salisbury might be in-
terested in. 
They agreed to meet. Cohen came to the State Capitol. He 
and Salisbury met in the cafeteria. Cohen, a former Minneapolis 
alderman who ha~ been active in the Independent-Republican 
Party, produced some court documents and said they were proof 
of criminal charges that had been brought against an important 
candidate for state office. 
Salisbury said Cohen told him he could have the documents 
if "I promise his name would not be used." 
Salisbury agreed he would not identify Cohen. "It was a 
1. Reprinted with permission of the St. Paul Pioneer Press. 
66
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss2/4
1994] COHEN v. COWLES MEDIA COMPANY 489 
battlefield decision," Salisbury says. "I wanted to get the infor-
mation. I felt I had it all to myself." 
He later learned that reporters from the Associated Press, 
the Minneapolis Tribune and at least one television station also 
had the same documents that showed Marlene Johnson, candi-
date fot lieutenant governor on the DFL ticket, had been con-
victed iI1 1970 of petty theft for walking out of a Sears store with 
$6 worth of sewing material. She also once had been arrested for 
unlawful assembly at a protest rally. 
After verifying the information with Marlene Johnson, Sal-
isbury called his city editor, Doug Hennes, to discuss how to 
handle the information. Both felt that the fact a candidate for 
major public office had a court record, even though for petty 
theft, was of public interest and ought to be reported. 
Hennes took the story and the confidentiality of the source 
issue to David Hall, executive editor. 
Hall agreed the information should be published. He be-
lieved, however, that the source also should be identified. Be-
cause of the nature of the charge, he felt strongly that the public 
should be made aware of the source. 
"Anonymity in this instance was not appropriate," Hall 
said. 
Anyone involved in a leak of this type, Hall believes, should 
be willing to be identified. "At one point, I thought about telling 
the source that we would not use the information at all unless 
we could name him," Hall said. "But this was not really an op-
tion since the information had been leaked to too many people." 
Hall also was enforcing a major news policy of these news-
papers. The policy states that news sources should be identified 
whenever possible. "Do not overuse the unidentified source ap-
proach," the policy states. "A reporter should check with his su-
perior before promising anonymity or confidentiality." 
Salisbury was instructed to call Cohen and tell him of the 
decision. Cohen was angry, Salisbury said. Later, Cohen called 
the newspaper and gave a statement for publication with the 
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Johnson story. 
I can understand his feeling of betrayal. He felt he had an 
agreement of confidentiality with us. 
(Please see letter on this page from Cohen's political associ-
ate, Gary Flakne.) 
But our staff acted in good faith. Salisbury made a quick 
decision that was contrary to the newspaper's policy. The deci-
sion was reviewed by a senior editor who decided this was an 
exceptional case that called for overruling the reporter. 
In political campaigns, newspapers should rarely accept 
data from sources who are unwilling to be publicly identified 
with charges against opposing candidates. 
There are times when confidentiality must be protected at 
all costs. 
This was not one of them. 
Finnegan is vice-president/editor of the Pioneer Press and 
Dispatch. 
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APPENDIX C 
SURVEY QUESTIONS 
1. What is your position? 
2. What is the circulation of your publication? 
3. What is the population of the area you serve? 
4a. How many employees does your publication employ full-
time? 
4b. How many reporters? 
5a. Does your publication have in-house counsel? Yes 
___ No 
5b. If no, do you use outside counsel for: 






___ employee personal legal problems 
6. What percentage of your sources ask for confidentiality? 
7. If you make a promise of confidentiality, what does that mean 
you canl cannot do? 
8. What percentage of time is a promise of confidentiality de-
nied? (What is your publication's response to a request for 
confidentiality?) 
69
Levin and Rubert: Cohen v. Cowles Media Company
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
492 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:423 
9a. Does your publication have a policy regarding reporters mak-
ing promises of confidentiality to sources? Yes __ _ 
No 
9b. If "yes", is this policy written? ___ Yes ___ No 
10. If the answer to question 9a is "yes", please describe the pol-
icy and its rationale. 
lla. If the answer to question 9a is "yes", has the policy been 
reviewed and/or revised in the past five years? Yes 
___ No 
llb. If the policy been reviewed and/or revised in the past five 
years, when was this done? 
12a. Does your publication have a policy regarding editors over-
riding reporters' promises of confidentiality? Yes 
___ No 
12b. If "yes", is this policy written? ___ Yes ___ No 
13. If the answer to question 12a is "yes", please describe the 
policy and its rationale. 
14a. If the answer to question 12a is "yes", has the policy been 
reviewed and/or revised in the past five years? 
14b. If the policy has been reviewed and/or revised in the past 
five years, when was this done? 
15. If the policy/ies was/were reviewed within the past two years, 
was the review prompted by reading or hearing about a U.S. Su-
preme Court decision about a promise of confidentiality? 
___ Yes No 
16. If the answer to question 15 is "yes", how did your publica-
tion become aware of this court decision? 
17. A recent U.S. Supreme Court decision held that a newspaper 
can be liable for compensatory damages (no punitive damages) if 
an editor overrides a reporter's promise of confidentiality. What 
do you think is likely to happen, if anything, in the newspaper 
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industry as a result of that decision? 
18. Do you think if the court had NOT awarded damages to a 
source whose confidentiality was breached, then your sources 
would dry up? 
19. How serious a damper on First Amendment freedom do you 
think this decision is? 
___ not serious 
___ somewhat serious 
___ serious 
___ very serIOUS 
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